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immortalized and preserved in ordinary American conversation. Perhaps this
honor is mitigated by the fact that "gerrymandering" describes the unsavory
practice of subdividing voters to produce a preconceived political result.
Furthermore, "gerrymandering" conjoins the ancient, honorable name of
Gerry with that of the slime-dwelling salamander and is usually mispro-
nounced with a soft "g."
Gerry, who had a distinguished career, deserves better. He was a signer
of the Declaration of Independence, a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention (whose product he neither admired nor signed),' a successfully
duplicitous diplomat in France, and Vice President of the United States.I
Gerry's etymological apotheosis is founded upon his signature, as governor
of Massachusetts, to a redistricting bill that created a congressional district
incorporating the morphology of a salamander. Contemporary wags referred
to the drawing of such unnatural boundaries as "gerrymandering."
Gerry had a role to play in the history of bankruptcy as well. While a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Gerry proposed that the "contract
clause" be extended to cover the federal government. If this had occurred,
the history of bankruptcy jurisprudence would have been much different;
but, fortunately for posterity, Gerry's motion died for want of a second.
This ornery assault upon federal bankruptcy may have provided at least
some small part in motivating that great Carolingian and author of the
Constitution's bankruptcy clause, Charles Pinckney, to remark, "I have
never met a man of less candor and as much duplicity as Mr. Gerry." 3
Some two hundred years later, Gerry-or at least his gerrymandering
method-has had its revenge upon bankruptcy jurisprudence. According to
section 1129(a)(10): "If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least
one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider."I
When a chapter 11 case involves a dominant undersecured creditor, section
1129(a)(10) suggests that the single secured creditor might have a veto over
the chapter 11 proceeding. Such a creditor can cause all classes-the secured
creditor class plus the class of unsecured creditors-to vote against the plan,
unless the plan proponent can gerrymander the creditors so as to produce a
yes-voting noninsider class to get by the requirement of section 1129(a)(10).5
1. See generally STEVE TALLY, BLAND AMBITION 41-43 (1992).
2. Gerry died in office and was among the one-third of our vice presidents who
failed to serve out their terms-whether due to death, promotion, resignation, or plea
bargaining. See generally id. at 41-47.
3. Id. at 45.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988).
5. See In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421, 423 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(Ayers, C.J.) ("If 'creative' classification and impairment are prohibited, it becomes
almost impossible for debtors like these to propose a plan which can be con-
[Vol. 44:565
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At stake is whether the so-called "single-asset" case can be reorganized
in chapter 11. The single-asset case typically involves a real estate invest-
ment in which a separately incorporated entity or partnership owns a single
piece of real estate. Classification determines the outcome of many of these
cases because, if the debtor must classify the gigantic unsecured deficit
claim together with the minor trade claims that probably exist (or which can
be made to exist), the class of unsecured creditors will surely vote against
the plan.6 Because of section 1129(a)(10), no plan can be confirmed if no
class of creditors agrees to it. On the other hand, if cooperative trade
creditors can be classified separately, the debtor can meet section
1129(a)(10) with ease. At that point, only cram down under section 1129(b)
stands between the debtor and confirmation of a plan.7
In the landmark case of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Greystone 111 Joint Venture (In re Greystone II Joint Venture),' Judge Edith
Jones, confounding her seat on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with a
more Sinaitic emolument, has declaimed, "thou shalt not classify similar
claims differently in order to gerrymander."' Yet, in her commandment,
"gerrymander" means only a discrimination between creditors that cannot
be justified. 10 Judge Jones held open the possibility that separate classi-
fication is permissible if a "rational" reason could be located. That is, the
Bankruptcy Code's principle of "equal protection" of creditors" might be
placated with a showing of mere rationality, as opposed to the "compelling"
standard that constitutional law would apply to invidious discrimination.
Therefore, Judge Jones's "eleventh commandment" is at least as susceptible
to evasion as its first ten predecessors-if only rational discriminatory
grounds can be located.
firmed ....").
6. See In re 266 Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275,284 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.) (Feller,
J.), aff'd sub nom. 266 Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington
Assocs.), 147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
7. The undersecured creditor in a single-asset case will tend to insist that its claim
be classified with the others, in order to sabotage the plan. But sometimes general
creditors insist on separate classification, as when they are outvoted in a class that wishes
to accept the plan. A creditor wishing separate classification probably wishes to trigger
the cram-down rules that apply only to dissenting creditors. In re Jersey City Medical
Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1987) (Mansmann, J.).
8. 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
9. Id. at 1279.
10. Cf. Hanson v. First Bank, 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (Wollman, J.)
(last minute counter-plan the day before the deadline was proof that the sole subjective
motive for classification scheme was gerrymandering).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988) (requiring that a plan "provide the same
treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder ... agrees
to a less favorable treatment"); id. § 1129(b)(1) (plan may "not discriminate unfairly").
19931
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This is not how Greystone is being interpreted. Rather, Greystone is
seen as a per se rule against separately classifying the unsecured deficit
claim of a dominant creditor. 2 Courts have been utilizing the per se rule
against classifying the unsecured deficit differently from trade claims as a
way of getting rid of unwanted chapter 11 plans, regardless of the quality
of the reasons a debtor might present for unified classification. 3 These
single-asset cases constitute about half the current chapter 11 docket of a
given bankruptcy judge. 4 Unified classification means that a dominant
undersecured creditor can show that a chapter 11 plan can never be con-
firmed. This showing might be made upon a motion to lift the automatic
stay under section 362(d)(2), because the debtor has no equity in the
collateral and the property is "not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion."" 5 In other words, if Greystone receives a per se treatment, a
12. See infra note 155.
13. One bankruptcy judge has gone so far as to ban all evidence of practical
differences between the unsecured deficit and trade claims. See Boston Post Rd. Ltd.
Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership), 154 B.R. 617, 622 n.3
(D. Conn. 1993) (referring to an exclusion by Judge Robert Krechevsky). On appeal,
Judge Alan Nevas pronounced himself "troubled by the Debtor's assertion that it was
precluded from presenting evidence to the Bankruptcy Court in support of its business
reasons for classifications." Id. Judge Nevas asked debtor's counsel what the differences
were. Counsel responded that the plan itself called for different treatment. As the plan
was before the court, Judge Nevas decided that the exclusion of evidence was harmless
error. Cf. T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v. Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. (In re
T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership, 5 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1993) (DeMoss, J.) (reversing
bankruptcy court for failure to give debtor an opportunity to develop reasons for separate
classification).
14. Good Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, 1 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 11, 15-16 (1993)
(remarks of Judges Fenning, Greendyke, Hillman and Mark).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1988). According to § 362(d):
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay...
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a)
of this section, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
03) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id. For cases in which the stay was lifted because unified classification prevented any
chance for plan confirmation, see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Roswell-Hannover
Joint Venture (In re Roswell-Hannover Joint Venture), 149 B.R. 1014, 1017 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992) (Bihary, J.); Piedmont Assocs. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 132
B.R. 75, 78 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Forrester, J.); In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers, C.J.).
Of course, the classification issue can also be raised at the confirmation hearing.
11 U.S.C. § 1128; e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVII (In re Bryson
Props., XVII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.) (Restani, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191
(Vol. 44:565
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bankruptcy judge can rid herself of the case not much more than 30 days
after the petition itself was filed. 16
This Article argues that, while gerrymandering simpliciter is verboten,
fundamental priority and practical differences usually exist to distinguish the
unsecured deficit and the trade claims. Indeed, the reasons for separate
classification are so overwhelmingly strong that perhaps there ought to be
a per se rule in favor of separate classification-precisely the opposite of
what courts have been doing. Though clearing dockets is an important social
goal, it cannot justify a clear misapplication of the Bankruptcy Code. If
courts will listen to the reasons for separate classification, they will find that
section 1129(a)(10) cannot clear their admittedly crowded dockets at all.
Rather, courts will have to give single-asset debtors their day in
court-inconvenient though that may seem.
Flexible classification often will be a necessary condition to reorganiz-
ing a single-asset case, but it is not also a sufficient condition. The debtor-
in-possession faces other legal impediments to confirmation of a plan. In
particular, even if the dominant undersecured creditor is separately classified
so that a class of the yes-voting creditors can propel the debtor-in-possession
past the rule of section 1129(a)(10), the no-voting dominant creditor is
(1992); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone Il Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72
(1992). Or it might be raised at a hearing to approve a debtor-in-possession's disclosure
statement. In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Abram,
J.); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.).
At least one appellate court has indicated that the standards ought to be different
between a ruling pertaining to the automatic stay and a ruling pertaining to confirmation
of the plan. In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Route 37 Business Park
Assocs. (In re Route 37 Business Park Assocs.), 146 B.R. 640 (D.N.J. 1992)
(Thompson, J.), rev'd, 987 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993), Judge Anne E. Thompson wrote,
"Under the facts of this case, we are skeptical whether the classification proposed by the
partnership would pass muster at a confirmation hearing." Id. at 644. Nevertheless, she
sustained the bankruptcy judge's refusal to lift the automatic stay because "the burden
of proof in a § 362(d) motion is much more relaxed than the burden at confirmation."
Id. It is not entirely clear whether Thompson was promulgating a rule of appellate review
or a rule that bankruptcy judges were expected to follow.
Classification is a matter of law, and it ought to be apparent early on whether the
secured creditor has a veto over the plan. Flexibility at the "lift stay" hearing surely is
a virtue only with regard to factual criteria, such as feasibility of the plan. For this
reason Judge Thompson found herself reversed on the notion that the sliding scale ought
to apply to questions of law. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d at 162 ("[Ihe
explanations advanced by the debtor are invalid as a matter of law, and therefore no
evidence that the debtor could offer at a confirmation hearing could cure their flaws.
Accordingly, since we see no reasonable possibility of confirmation, we hold that the lift
stay order should have been granted.").
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (stay lifted within 30 days unless court orders otherwise).
1993]
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entitled to the cram-down rights of an unsecured creditor. These rights
include the right to invoke the absolute priority rule. According to the abso-
lute priority rule, dissenting general creditors may insist that no inferior
party receive any property under the plan unless they themselves are fully
paid."1 The new value exception states that the absolute priority rule does
not bar the sale of new equity interests to those who held the old, extin-
guished equity interests.8
If the absolute priority rule bars the new value exception, then even
well-gerrymandered dominant creditors can block a reorganization of a
single-asset entity. Unless the old equity holders can emerge as the owners
of the reorganized entity, they will surely lose interest in the plan and allow
the undersecured party to foreclose. Indeed, it is no coincidence that
classification of the unsecured deficit and the new value exception have been
litigated together in many of the leading cases, as if they were two facets of
the same issue.1' Indeed, between these two different cudgels by which a
dominant secured party may club to death a single-asset chapter 11
proceeding, the classification veto has proven to be the more effective
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
18. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988).
19. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props.,
XVIm, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.) (Restani, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992);
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone ImI Joint Venture (In re Greystone m Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs. (In re Route 37 Bus.
Park Assocs.), 146 B.R. 640 (D.N.J. 1992) (Thompson, J.); Confederation Life Ins. Co.
v. Beau Rivage Ltd., 126 B.R. 632, 635 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Ward, J.); Piedmont Assocs.
v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75, 78 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Forrester, J.); In re
SM 104 Ltd., No. 92-22698-BKC-AJC, 1993 WL 366619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 15,
1993) (Ginsburg, J.); In re 266 Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 284 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.) (Feller, J.), aff'd sub nom. 266 Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In
re Washington Assocs.), 147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Creekside Landing Ltd.,
140 B.R. 713, 715 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992) (Lundin, J.); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust,
134 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Woodscape Ltd. Partnership (In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership), 134 B.R. 165
(Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (Derby, J.); In re Lumber Exch. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000,
1006 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (O'Brien, J.), aff'd, 134 B.R. 354 (D. Minn. 1991) (Murphy,
J.), aff'd, 968 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Sherwood Square Assocs., 107 B.R. 872,
876 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (Derby, J.); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1989) (Lundin, J.) (disapproving plan on other grounds); see also Teamsters
Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800
F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) (dominant labor union protested classification and
also the new value exception).
For a discussion emphasizing this relationship between classification and the new
value exception, see In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Abram, J.).
[Vol. 44:565
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weapon.' Accordingly, this Article bypasses the new value battle and
instead ponders the classification issue, which constitutes the real front lines
in the war of secured creditors against chapter 11.2
I. VOTING IN CHAPTER 11
In chapter 11, the creditors vote on the mode of distribution. This
20. On rehearing in Greystone, the appellate panel decided to withdraw all parts of
the opinion relating to the new value exception, to the consternation of Judge Jones,
leaving only the classification issue still standing. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1284-85. This
suggests that the new value exception is a weaker justification of the veto.
That classification constitutes an effective veto for dominant secured creditors has
emerged only very recently. In a debate over the propriety of chapter 12 (farm
reorganizations), two commentators assessing creditor rights under chapter 11 did not
even mention § 1 129(a)(10) as a source of veto. Rather, one asserted the absolute priority
rule, and the other denied it in light of the new value exception, but neither raised the
possibility that no class of creditors would vote to approve a farm reorganization in what
often amounts to a single-asset case. Compare James J. White, Taking from Farm
Lenders and Farm Debtors: Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 J. CORP. LAw 1
(1987) with Patrick B. Bauer, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: A Response
to Professor White's Sortie Against Chapter 12, 13 J. CORP. LAW 33 (1987).
21. A different question I will also evade-except for what is set forth in this
footnote-is whether different classifications will justify substantive differences in
treatment between different classes of unsecured creditors. Only classification for voting
purposes is discussed, as that issue determines whether the dominant undersecured
creditor can veto the continuation of a chapter 11 proceeding.
The governing rule on inter-class discrimination is found in § 1129(b)(1), which
applies only when a class of creditors has voted no. Section 1129(b)(1) allows
confirmation only "if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair an equitable,
with respect each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1); cf. id. § 1123(a)(4) (requiring that a plan
.provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class").
For cases upholding different substantive treatment for general creditor claims of
the same rank, see In re Chateaugay Corp., 155 B.R. 625 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Conrad, J.); In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (Murphy, J.),
appeal dismissed, 956 F.2d 1065 (1lth Cir. 1992); In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R.
421 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers, C.J.); In re AG Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 77
B.R. 665 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re White House Grain Co., 60 B.R. 16 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1986) (Goldhaber, J.) (creditors with conversion tort claims could be paid
100% while other general creditors got less); In re Rochem, Ltd., 58 B.R. 641 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1985) (Commisa, J.); cf. Barnes v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 201
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robb, J.) (requiring that like creditors be treated alike); In re
Cranberry Hill Assocs., 150 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (Kenner, J.) (paying
some creditors 65% now and paying the unsecured deficit 100% over time unfair to the
unsecured deficit). See generally John C. Anderson, Classification of Claims and
Interests in Reorganization Cases Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J.
99 (1984).
1993]
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differentiates chapter 11 from chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. While
general creditors in chapter 7 elect the trustee,22 they may not vote on
distribution, which is dogmatically fixed by Bankruptcy Code section 726.
In chapter 11, however, creditors may vote on the distributional system
promulgated by the plan.
Voting in chapter 11 is by class. There is good reason for this. Prior
to the enactment of Bankruptcy Act section 77B23 and the reorganization
chapters that soon followed,24 businesses were reorganized by means of
equity receiverships under the pre-Erie federal common law. The receiver
could not force a creditor to compromise her claim. Instead, a creditor could
hold out against a consensual plan in order to obtain a greater recovery.25
Accordingly, while the principal creditors worked out some means to save
the going concern of a firm, the lesser creditors soon learned the profit in
protesting too much; such creditors were cashed out, so that the larger
creditors-the ones who really stood to lose if the company were not
reorganized-could proceed through compromise to reorganize the company.
The reorganization acts therefore introduced class voting, so that single
creditors could not hold up the entire proceeding in order to get paid. The
Bankruptcy Code, of course, continues these rules. It requires that two-
thirds of claims (by amount) in the class vote yes, and, in addition, that a
flat majority (by head count) also vote yes.26 If the class votes in favor of
the plan, dissenting creditors within the class are forced to go along with the
majority, at least for voting purposes.27 If the class votes no, then the plan
may still be confirmed, but only if the debtor crams down the plan.28
22. 11 U.S.C. § 702.
23. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22 (1934) (repealed 1978).
24. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
25. Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir.
1929) (McDermitt, J.) ("Each bondholderhas the absolute right to determine for himself,
in case of default, whether he shall take his loss and quit, or continue to gamble . . .");
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48
HARv. L. REv. 1100, 1100-03 (1935). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and the little-used
creditor compositions of § 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained class voting as
well. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 87 (1990).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
27. Thus, in In re 11,111, Inc., 117 B.R. 471 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (Kressel, J.),
two minor creditors, classified together with huge yes-voting creditors, demanded
separate classification so that they could preserve their cram-down rights. Their motion
was denied. The case is the mirror opposite of the typical situation discussed here, where
the debtor wants to gerrymander minor yes-voting creditors into classes separate from
those of the dominant undersecured creditor.
28. In re Northeast Dairy Co-op. Fed'n, 73 B.R. 239, 251-52 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1987) (Gerling, J.).
[Vol. 44:565
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It is easy to over-estimate the benefit of the creditor franchise.
Generally, even if creditors vote no, the plan can still be confirmed,
provided the so-called "cram-down" rules of section 1129(b) are met.29 A
no vote, then, does nothing more than trigger the cram-down protections,
with this important exception: If no class of impaired creditors votes yes, the
plan cannot be confirmed, by virtue of the rule in section 1129(a)(10).10
If one class does vote yes, then all the dissenters in other no-voting classes
can be crammed down under section 1129(b).31 The trick, then, is to
classify the creditors in such a way as to produce at least one yes-voting
class of impaired creditors.
Classification for voting purposes is governed by section 1122, which
provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may
place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such
class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only
of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that
the court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative con-
venience.32
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). See generally Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v.
Bank of N.Y. (In re Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 879-80 (1lth Cir. 1990) (Cox, J.)
(describing the relationship between Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a) and (b)); Teamsters
Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800
F.2d 581, 583 (6th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) ("Confirmation under subsection (b) is
commonly referred to as a 'cram down' because it permits a reorganization plan to go
into effect over the objections of one or more impaired classes of creditors.").
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). Section 1129(a)(10) is set forth supra text accompany-
ing note 4. Prior to 1984, § 1129(a)(10) did not specify whether the yes-voting class had
to be impaired. Meanwhile, § 1126(f) states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of [§
1126], a class that is not impaired ... [is] conclusively presumed to have accepted the
plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f). Creditors tried to argue that an unimpaired class is enough
to satisfy § 1129(a)(10), though some courts have reasoned that only the yes vote of an
impaired class could count. In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 B.R. 952, 967-70
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey, J.). See generally Ethan D. Fogel, Confirmation and the
Unimpaired Class of Creditors: Is a "Deemed Acceptance"Deemed an Acceptance?, 58
AM. BANKR. L.J. 151 (1984).
In 1984, Congress amended § 1129(a)(10) to make express the requirement that an
impaired class of creditors must vote yes. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 512(a)(9), 98 Stat. 333, 387.
31. See In re S & W Enters., 37 B.R. 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (disapproving the
use of administrative classes for the purpose of meeting the requirements of §
1129(a)(10)).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1122.
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Section 1122 is easily applied to oversecured creditors. Since the
classes of creditors must contain those with substantially similar claims,
secured parties routinely end up in a one-member class.33 An undersecured
creditor's secured and unsecured claims (following bifurcation) cannot be
put in the same class under this rule.34 Also, placing a secured party with
different collateral (even highly fungible collateral) in the same class is not
allowed.35
It is often observed that, while section 1122 prohibits placing dissimilar
claims in the same class, it does not require that similar creditors be placed
in the same class.3 6 Indeed, section 1122 itself authorizes separate classifica-
33. BANKR. R. 3014 advisory committee note ("[O]rdinarily each secured creditor is
in a separate and distinct class."); In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.) (secured parties with different collateral cannot be put in same
class for voting purposes); In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985)
(Mixon, J.) ("Secured creditors with liens in different property or liens in the same
property but with different priorities may not be classified together since their legal rights
are not substantially similar.").
34. In re Coventry Commons Assocs., 155 B.R. 446, 450-51 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(Duggan, J.); 266 Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington Assocs.),
147 B.R. 827, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Dearie, J.); In re B & B W. 164th St. Corp., 147
B.R. 832, 838 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Duberstein, J.); In re E.I. Parks No. 1 Ltd.
Partnership, 122 B.R. 549, 557 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (Mixon, J.). Both Coventry
Gardens and Washington Associates describe placing the secured and unsecured portions
of a secured creditor's claim in the same class as tantamount to making the § 1111 (b)(2)
election on behalf of the secured creditor, which, of course, only the secured creditor can
make. In re Birdneck Apt. Assocs., II L.P., 156 B.R. 499, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993)
(Tice, J.) (ruling that failure to make election does not allow the debtor to impose it).
Coventry Commons additionally holds that giving the secured creditor more than the
minimum required under § 1129(a)(7)(B) does not relieve the secured creditor of its right
to make or decline the election. Coventry Commons, 155 B.R. at 452. The § 111 l(b)(2)
election is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 93-107.
For dicta favoring the unitary classification of a creditor's secured and unsecured
deficit claims, see In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993). In D & W Realty, Judge Prudence Abram approved a disclosure statement for a
plan in which the secured and unsecured deficit claims were in fact separately classified.
35. Brady v. Andrew (In re Commercial W. Fin. Corp.), 761 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Pregerson, J.) (mortgage participations). This was not always the practice
under the Bankruptcy Act. In the famous case of Seidel v. Palisades-on-the-Desplaines
(In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines), 89 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1937), all the secured creditors
were placed in one class, and most of them outvoted an unhappy secured creditor to
accept the plan. Judge William Sparks ruled that, since all the creditors were to receive
more under the plan than under the alternative liquidation scenario, such a classification
error might be overlooked. Id. at 218. See generally Anderson, supra note 21, at 102-03.
36. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S.
Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.); see also Olympia & York
Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 879-80 (1lth
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tion of pari passu creditors when "administrative convenience" is served.37
This principle differentiates modem section 1122 from old Bankruptcy Act
section 597 (chapter X), which provided that "the judge shall fix the
division of creditors and stockholders into classes according to the nature of
their respective claims and stock."" Old section 597 was interpreted to
require that creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property be
placed in the same class. 39 In contrast, section 751(1) of old chapter XI
followed a different rule: the plan could "include provisions for treatment
of unsecured creditors on a parity with each other, or for the division of
such debts into classes and the treatment thereof in different ways. "40
Whether the Bankruptcy Code follows the inflexible chapter X rule or
the tolerant chapter XI rule remains unclear. 4' The legislative history is
Cir. 1990) (Cox, J.) (proponent of plan has wide, but not unlimited discretion to classify
creditors creatively); In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (3d Cir.
1987) (Mansmann, J.) (bankruptcy judges have wide discretion in finding classifications
rational); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Mikva, J.)
(requiring an objecting creditor to show not only that similar claimants appear in
different classes, but also that those in its class have disparate claims); In re Atlanta W.
VI, 91 B.R. 620 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (Cotton, J.) (plan could separately classify a
general creditor who intended to advance a postpetition loan); cf. Barnes v. Whelan (In
re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robb, J.) (chapter 13, which
incorporates § 1122 by reference in § 1322(b)(1)).
Section 1129(b)(1) provides that a plan may not "discriminate unfairly." This
section is usually not read to bar classification of pari passu creditors in different classes
(for voting purposes) if the discrimination is rational. See In re Jersey City Medical Ctr.,
817 F.2d 1055; In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(Ayers, C.J.). Whether it is possible to pay different classes of general creditors different
dividends is another matter. See supra note 21.
37. On administrative convenience, see In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32
B.R. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 39 B.R. 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). In Mastercraft Judge Prudence Abram wrote: "The purpose of § 1122(b) is to
allow a plan to reduce the number of creditors eligible to vote. This result is accom-
plished by offering creditors holding small claims of perhaps a few hundred dollars each
a 100% payment and thus providing that they are not impaired." Id. at 108.
38. Bankruptcy Act § 197, 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1976) (repealed 1978).
39. In re Los Angeles Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D. Haw. 1968)
(Tavares, J.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971); William Blair, Classification of
Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 212-13
(1984).
40. Bankruptcy Act § 357(1), 11 U.S.C. § 757(1) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis
added). These rules applied only to unsecured claims. The secured creditors could not
be impaired under old chapter XI. Blair, supra note 39, at 214.
41. Judge Cornelia Kennedy assumes that, by aping the language of § 751 in § 1122,
Congress intended to institute the rule of flexible classifications. Teamsters Nat'l Freight
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581,
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confusing, stating merely: "This section codifies current case law surround-
ing the classification of claims and equity securities. "42 Courts are divided
over the issue. Some have insisted that "[t]he general rule regarding
classification is that 'all creditors of equal rank with claims against the same
property shall be placed in the same class."' 43 Others have permitted
creditors of the same rank to be put in different classes if the creditors are
nevertheless dissimilarly situated.4" In short, one can divide the case law as
follows: One group demands the presence of differences in legal priority;
the other group recognizes practical differences in order to justify separate
classification of unsecured claims.45
Meanwhile, it is worth remembering that if either a practical difference
or a priority difference between unsecured claims is "substantial," then
section 1122(a) directly prohibits placing them in the same class.46 This
586 (6th Cir. 1986). She further argues that chapter X was stiff and formal, while old
chapter XI was generally flexible. Because new chapter 11 is flexible, the more flexible
classification rule should be followed as well.
Some commentators point to the legislative history of § 1122, which describes §
1122 as requiring "classification based on the nature of the claims." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6362. "Nature
of the claims" was a phrase from old Chapter X and was often taken back then to mean
"rank," not informal differences unreflective of legal priority. This point is bolstered by
reference to the bill drafted in 1973 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S.,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 241 (1973). According to § 7-302
of this predecessor bill, classes could be organized if the claims were "of substantially
similar character and the members of which enjoy substantially similar rights."
According to one commentator, the change from emphasis on rights to mere nature
means that Congress intended a liberal classification rule. Blair, supra note 39, at 201-
02; see also Louis S. Robin, Classification of Claims: An Examination of Disregarding
Legislative History, 98 CoM. L.J. 225 (1993).
42. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 41, at 406, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6362; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5785, 5904.
43. Granada Wines, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 46 (ist Cir. 1984) (Coffin, J.) (quoting Scherk v. Newton (In re
Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 152 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1945)).
44. E.g., In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Mansmann, J.); U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 587; In re Chateaugay Corp., 155 B.R. 625
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Conrad, J.).
45. One additional case asserts that no reason need be given for separate classifica-
tion. Because § 1122(a) does not prohibit gerrymandering, it is allowed. Contrary views
are vilified as the mere creation of policy. In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67,
70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993) (Bohanon, J.).
46. In re SM 104 Ltd., No. 92-22698-BKC-AJC, 1993 WL 366619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Sept. 15, 1993) (Ginsburg, J.); In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385,401 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
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requirement is often overlooked in the single-creditor cases, where the
courts seem to treat classification as within the discretion of either the
debtor-in-possession or the courts. Yet, at best, this should only be true with
regard to insubstantial differences. If the differences are substantial, then
separate classification is compelled. 7
As we shall see, in single-asset cases, especially where the dominant
secured creditor has advanced nonrecourse credit-separate classification is
compulsory, because the artificial recourse claim has a different priority
from that of the trade creditors.45
II. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 1129(A)(10)
In In re Greystone III Joint Venture,49 Judge Leif Clark ruled that
separate classification of trade creditors and the unsecured deficit was indeed
appropriate. The opinion contains a detailed history of section 1129(a)(10),
worthy of study in itself.5 0 The history, as interpreted by Judge Clark, is
supposed to show that a radically undersecured party is not entitled to a
classification that guarantees it a veto of the plan by virtue of section
1129(a)(10). Strictly speaking, the historical exploration was not necessary
to the result, because Clark finally concluded that pure gerrymandering
could not justify a separate classification of trade debt.51 Rather, Clark
demanded reasons other than the desire to cram down the plan against the
protesting undersecured creditor. This was precisely the position that Judge
Edith Jones took in reversing Judge Clark.5"
Nevertheless, the historical account is most illuminating for the
1989) (Murphy, J.), appeal dismissed, 956 F.2d 1065 (1lth Cir. 1992).
47. In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 670 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1992) (Treel, J.) (suggesting that different priority is per se a "substantial" difference
between creditors).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 74-92.
49. 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aft'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990),
rev'd, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
50. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 562-66.
51. Id. at 568; see also Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. (In re
Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (Cox, J.); Piedmont Assocs. v.
Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75, 78 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Forrester, J.); In re
Lumber Exch. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000, 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (O'Brien, J.), aff'd,
134 B.R. 354 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Valrico
Square Ltd. Partnership, 113 B.R. 794 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Weaver, J.). Judge
Richard Bohanon, however, takes the strong position that because § 1122(a) does not
prohibit gerrymandering, then the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code permits it. In
re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
52. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1278-79.
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light-or the darkness-it sheds on the attitude of Congress toward
bankruptcy jurisdiction over the singe-asset case.
Prior to the Bankruptcy Code, courts could cram down single-asset real
estate cases in old chapter XII even if every creditor voted no. Old chapter
XII had no absolute priority rule;53 an undersecured creditor could be
limited to the value of the collateral, and the old equity interests would
survive to benefit from any appreciation in value that accrued after
confirmation of the plan. All that the undersecured party could hope for was
the appraised value of the collateral as it existed at the time the plan was
confirmed.
Nevertheless, some old cases rebelled at the prospect of cram down
when all the creditors opposed the plan. Accordingly, these cases required
that, before a plan could be confirmed, some of the impaired creditors had
to vote in favor of the plan. 4 It was these cases, obviously, that inspired
section 1129(a)(10).
None of the cases asserting this judge-made rule, though, was a one-
asset case where the creditor asserted an absolute right to veto the reorgani-
zation plan even though other minor creditors favored it. The function of
section 1129(a)(10) as a dominant-creditor veto seems to be a modem func-
tion for the old rule. The rule, taken on its own terms, simply expressed the
idea that reorganization had to benefit creditors somehow and that a yes-
voting creditor was necessary to prove this benefit existed." It is far from
clear that the old rule required a yes-voting class of voters; some support
within a no-voting class might have sufficed.56
53. Bankruptcy Act § 472(5), 11 U.S.C. § 872(5) (1976) (repealed 1978).
54. Herweg v. Neuses (In re Herweg), 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941) (Sparks, J.)
(chapter X11); see Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Chapter XII Cram-Down Provisions, 82
COMM. L.J. 197, 198 (1977) ("apparently an unbroken judicial gloss").
55. Thus, according to Judge Barbara Crabb:
[I]f no class of creditors agrees to the plan, it would not be equitable to
impose acceptance of the plan upon the creditors by enforcing the debtor's
interest in confirmation of the plan through the cramdown authority. The point
is, if no impaired class accepts the plan, the debtor has failed to ,negotiate
effectively with its creditors in devising a reorganization plan. I find nothing
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act to indicate that Congress intended that the
bankruptcy courts could saddle creditors with a stake in a reorganized
corporation under a plan that had received no acceptances from impaired
classes of creditors.
In re Polytherm Indus., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
56. In the original case promulgating the rule, all creditors unanimously opposed the
plan; no one dominant creditor was demanding a veto contrary to the wishes of other
creditors who wished to vote yes. Heriveg, 119 F.2d 941; see also Taylor v. Wood, 458
F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (the only existing creditor voted no); Sumida v.
Yumen, 409 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1969) (Carter, J.); Meyer v. Rowen, 195 F.2d 263
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During 1977, when the drafting of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was
most intense, two noted bankruptcy judges repudiated the old cases that had
required a class of creditors to vote yes on the plan; they crammed down
plans even though not a single class of creditors had voted for the plan. 7
One of the points made by these judges was that a debtor could easily
generate trade debt and then default upon it. The trade debt could be
impaired and induced to vote yes on the plan. Therefore, these judges
thought that the old equity rule insisting on one yes vote was useless. 8
If these two cases irritated the real estate lenders, the case that truly
inflamed them was Great National Life Insurance Co. v. Pine Gate
Associates (In re Pine Gate Associates)." In Pine Gate, several nonre-
course, undersecured creditors had financed the construction of some
condominia. In the middle of construction, the debtor filed for bankruptcy
and, after a valuation of the collateral, successfully put a limit on the
maximum size of the secured claims. As a result, any gain in collateral
value would go to the equity holders. Since the lenders were nonrecourse,
they could not even share in the gain on the strength of the unsecured deficit
claims. Indeed, if they were cashed out by an amount equal to the value of
their secured claim, they were deemed unimpaired by the reorganization
plan and, therefore, were deemed to have voted yes on the plan.'
In response to these cases, the Senate version of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act encoded the current principle of section 1129(a)(10). 6 But one flaw in
the Senate bill requiring a yes vote from a class of creditors was that, in
many real estate deals, the dominant secured party has no recourse against
(10th Cir. 1952) (Murrah, J.) (single creditor; "no creditors can be found to consent"
to the plan).
57. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta Cobb Apts. Co. (In re Marietta
Cobb Apts. Co.), 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Babbitt, J.);
In re Hobson Pike Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1205 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976)
(Norton, J.).
58. Marietta Cobb, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 724; Hobson Pike, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) at 1210, 1213-14; see also Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perimeter Park Inv.
Assocs. (In re Perimeter Park Inv. Assocs.), 697 F.2d 945 (11th Cir. 1983) (Fay, J.)
(agreeing with these interpretations of the Bankruptcy Act).
59. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976); see General Elec. Mort.
Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 B.R. 987, 999 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) ("Section 1111(b) was designed to overrule In re Pine Gate Associates.").
60. See In re Polytherm Indus., 33 B.R. 823, 833-34 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (Crabb, J.).
61. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1130(a)(12) (1978). For a history that traces §
1129(a)(10) back to the testimony of Edward J. Kalik, a senior vice president of
Massachusetts Life Insurance Co., see In re Polytherm Indus., 33 B.R. at 833-34; see
also Fogel, supra note 30, at 160-61 (quoting the National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts as complaining that "recent, well-publicized cases" had shifted value
from secured creditors to junior interests).
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the debtor. If the debtor troubled to create a little unsecured trade debt,
these trade creditors could comprise a separate class that would vote yes on
the plan, thereby negating the opposition of the dominant undersecured
party.62 Hence, the Senate, after conferring with the House, added section
111 1(b)(1)(A), which transformed nonrecourse lenders into recourse lenders
in any chapter 11 case.63 Section 1111(a)(1)(b), together with section
1129(a)(10), effectively gave dominant undersecured creditors in single-asset
cases a veto over confirmation of a plan-unless some class of impaired
creditors could be set up to vote in favor of the plan.
Judge Clark thought that the history of the Bankruptcy Code showed
that creative classification could negate the veto that the dominant under-
secured creditor might otherwise have by virtue of section 1129(a)(10). In
his view, the Senate may have favored the veto, but the House did not.
When the bankruptcy bill went to conference, the Senate accepted the House
version of cram down.' 4 The Senate subsequently added section
111 1(b)(1)(A), changing nonrecourse lenders into recourse lenders. It also
retained the one-class-must-vote-yes rule of section 1129(a)(10).
Judge Clark claimed that section 1129(a)(10) was an alternative to cram
down-that section 1129(a)(10) was thoughtlessly retained "without
explanation or comment, and apparently without consideration of either that
section's relationship or impact upon the cram-down provisions brought into
the draft from the House version."' As evidence, Clark recalled "that the
Senate version had the requirement of at least one accepting class even
though it did not have a 'cram-down' provision."' He pointed out that
explanations of cram down never alluded to a role for section
1129(a)(10). 67
Meanwhile, both the Senate and House versions of the bankruptcy
legislation
62. This point had been used to justify the rejection of the old equity rule that one
class must vote yes; if the rule was so easily evaded in nonrecourse cases, why bother
having the rule? See Marietta Cobb, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 724; Hobson Pike, 3
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 1210, 1213-14.
63. This transmogrification is discussed in David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims
Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial
Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 253 (1989).
64. Accordingly, the Senate dropped its own provision governing real estate
mortgages. According to this discarded provision, the only impairment of mortgages
allowed was cure and reinstatement or extension of payment schedules (in a way that
protected present value). S. 2266, supra note 61, § 1129(d).
65. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 565 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 565 n.6.
67. Id. at 565 & n.7.
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contained nearly identical provisions regarding classification, and the
legislative history only confirms that Congress did not envision any
particular restrictions on the creative use of the classification powers,
other than that (1) dissimilar claims could not be forced into the same
class and (2) an impaired and dissenting class could not be treated
differently than another class of equal dignity.68
In Clark's view, both houses favored creative classification, but only the
Senate favored a veto for undersecured creditors in single-asset cases. He
therefore cast a plague upon both houses of Congress.
Congress thus adopted an unclear middle position on the question of
single asset real estate cases in bankruptcy. It could have given secured
creditors veto power over reorganizations had it enacted the Senate
version. It could also have effectively gagged the secured creditor had
it settled solely on the House version. Instead Congress made sausage,
and as a result, courts and practitioners are left with a reorganization
chapter which, when applied to single asset real estate cases, is rife with
inconsistencies. 69
The inconsistency that the House and Senate left unresolved, according to
Clark, was this: a nonrecourse secured creditor is given recourse and is
given an unsecured claim, and the debtor must produce one yes-voting class
of impaired creditors. Yet creative classification of trade debt is approved
in section 1122:
The only limitation on that tactic apparent on the face of the Code is the
requirement that, as between the trade and the deficiency claim, the plan
not unfairly discriminate. A creditor "victimized" by such tactics will
be quick to point to Section 1129(a)(3), which requires the plan to have
been proposed "in good faith," but that position is tenable only if one
first concludes that the purpose of Section 1129(a)(10) was to assist in
preventing debtors from obtaining access to the cramdown provisions,
an assumption which this court finds is suspect.?°
In the end, Judge Clark thought that single-asset cases should not be subject
to veto by the dominant secured party. Rather, "in real estate cases such as
this, the ultimate confrontation will take place over whether the plan can
satisfy the stringent requirements of cram-down imposed by Section 1129(b),
not whether it can satisfy the hyper-technical (and largely impractical)
68. Id. at 565-66.
69. Id. at 566.
70. Id.
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requirements of Section 1129(a)(10).""'
In spite of the energy with which Judge Clark portrays this history of
section 1129(a)(10), his account is not entirely plausible. It is very possible
to view the history as introducing a strong veto power over single-asset
cases by dominant secured creditors by virtue of section 111 1(b)(1)(A) in
combination with section 1129(a)(10).72 Together with the anti-discrimina-
tion rule of section 1129(b), these provisions could easily be interpreted to
mean that classification cannot be manipulated to negate the veto that
Congress intended undersecured creditors to have in single-asset cases.
Indeed, that is precisely the position that Judge Edith Jones took on appeal
in Greystone.73 But this is getting ahead of our story.
III. PRIORITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RECOURSE AND
NONRECOURSE CLAIMS
If the artificial recourse claim of the dominant secured creditor has a
different priority from that of the trade creditors, separate classification is
mandatory, and the classification veto is dead. Can such priority differences
71. Id. Compare Judge Clark's indignant opinion in In re Anderson Oaks (Phase I)
Ltd. Partnership, 77 B.R. 108, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987). In Anderson Oaks, not
a single creditor in addition to the undersecured creditor existed. Therefore, Clark found
the chapter 11 to have been filed in bad faith:
Here, boiled down to its essence, is an attempt by an investor group to
use the Bankruptcy Code as a device with which to force its lender into
renegotiating their loan. It is true that Section 506 does contemplate limiting
a secured claim to the value of the collateral securing the claim. It is equally
true that Section 1129(b) contemplates forcing an involuntary loan upon
recalcitrant creditors in order to attain confirmation of a plan. It is not true,
however, that those provisions are available to any investor looking to
refinance his loan. The requirement of at least one impaired class of creditors
who have affirmatively voted for the plan and who are not insiders must be
met in order to invoke the "cram-down" provisions of Section 1129(b). In
short, there must be some one other than the debtor, other than the insiders,
and other than the target of the cram down, who cares enough about the
reorganization and whose rights must also be considered to invoke the
equitable grounds that justify resort to cram down.
Id. at 112-13. This indignation against bad-faith filings in single-asset cases entirely
evaporates when a debtor remembers to forget to pay trade creditors before filing for
chapter 11 protection.
72. E.g., In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1015, 1021 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The purpose of the section 1111(b) election is to allow the
undersecured creditor a right to potentially dominate the vote within the unsecured class;
the larger the nonrecourse claim, the larger that claimant's voice sounds.") (Brozman,
J.).
73. 948 F.2d at 139-40.
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be located? The answer is a strong and definitive yes, thereby implying that
a great many of the classification cases, such as Greystone, were wrongly
decided. What follows is a list of differences in legal priority.
A. The Implications of Section 723(a)
The leading case of In re Greystone 111 Joint Venture74 presents a very
typical single-asset case. In Greystone the debtor owed a nonrecourse
mortgagee $9.3 million, and the collateral (an office building) was worth
$5,825,000. The undersecured deficit claim was therefore almost $3.5
million. The debtor also owed approximately $10,000 in unsecured trade
debt.75
Because the debtor was a partnership, the trade creditors had claims
against the general partners of the debtor.76 Under the rule of section
111 l(b)(1)(A),77 the nonrecourse undersecured party was transformed into
a recourse creditor. This artificial recourse was against the debtor only,
however, not against the general partners,78 who were not subject to the
rule of section l1ll(b)()(A).79
Because the trade claims had recourse against the general partner (while
the secured party had none), a priority difference existed, which has often
been overlooked. This difference exploits the key rule in section
1 129(a)(7)(A) that entitles every creditor to at least as much in chapter 11
as she would have received in chapter 7.8O
In chapter 7, the nonrecourse secured party would lose its artificial
74. 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aft'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990),
rev'd 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
75. Greystone, 127 B.R. at 139.
76. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 561.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A) (1988) ("A claim securedby a lien on property of the
estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the
holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether
or not such holder has such recourse ....
78. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 570.
79. See In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1015, 1018 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993) (Brozman, J.)
80. According to §1129(a)(7)(A),
With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or
interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.
11 U.S.C § 1129(a)(7)(A).
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recourse because this right comes from section 1111 (b)(1)(A)-a rule not
applicable in chapter 7. Meanwhile, in chapter 7, the trade creditors would
have their recourse against the debtor partnership. Under the rule of section
723(a), the partnership's chapter 7 trustee would be subrogated to this
recourse against the general partners."' The chapter 7 trustee's recovery
would increase the bankruptcy dividend for the trade creditors, but the
nonrecourse secured party would not share in this bounty. In fact, if the
general partner were solvent, section 723(a) implies that trade creditors
would recover 100 cents on the dollar in chapter 7. 2
Meanwhile, back in chapter 11, section 1129(a)(7)(A) insists that the
trade creditors receive 100 cents on the dollar-the amount they would have
received in chapter 7 when a general partner is solvent.8 3 Section
111 1(b)(1)(A) changes the nonrecourse lender into a recourse creditor. But,
under section 1129(a)(7)(A), this artificial recourse claim is entitled to aminimum of zero, because zero is what this claim would receive in chapter
7. This is not to say the artificial recourse claim will be allocated zero. In
fact, once collateral is assigned to the secured claim and the trade creditors
obtain 100 cents on the dollar, the artificial recourse claim is entitled to
receive the equivalent of all remaining assets. The point is, however, that
the trade claims are senior to artificial recourse claims; these claims have
different priorities in chapter 11, not only permitting but compelling separate
classification.'
If this argument is accepted, it is clear that a great many of the cases,
such as Greystone, that honor the dominant undersecured creditor's classifi-
cation veto were wrongly decided. But before we say so, it is necessary to
81. According to § 723(a):
If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims
which are allowed in a case under this chapter concerning a partnership and
with respect to which a general partner of the partnership is personally liable,
the trustee shall have a claim against such general partner for the full amount
of the deficiency.
11 U.S.C. § 723(a).
82. In re Monetary Group, 55 B.R. 297, 299 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (Proctor, J.).
83. Also, if the trade creditors receive 100 cents on the dollar, it is possible, but not
required, that the trade creditors would be unimpaired. If trade creditors are unimpaired,
they are deemed to vote yes, but their votes do not count toward satisfying § 1 129(a)(10).
This is no obstacle for debtors-in-possession. If the trade creditors are paid over time,
and not in cash on the effective date of the plan, the trade creditors are probably
impaired. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (defining impairment). The issue of unnecessary or
sham impairment is discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-199.
84. In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (Lundin, J.); In
re SM 104 Ltd., No. 92-22698-BKC-AJC, 1993 WL 366619, at *13-17 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. Sept. 15, 1993) (Ginsburg, J.) (but refusing to confirm the plan because the cram
down interest rate was too low and the plan was not feasible).
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dispose of a subtle argument to the contrary.
According to the above argument, the trade creditors have a higher
priority than the artificial recourse claim in chapter 11 because trade
creditors would have access to assets in chapter 7 that the nonrecourse
creditor could not get. When some unencumbered assets would exist in the
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation conjured forth by section
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), the trade creditor priority exists even without the trustee's
right to pursue the general partners under section 723(a). In a single-asset
bankruptcy, however, the hypothetical chapter 7 estate may well have no
assets at all-except the chapter 7 trustee's right to pursue the general
partners under section 723(a). Under these circumstances, the trade creditor
argument for chapter 11 priority rests entirely on the section 723(a) cause
of action. Of course, the equity owners of the debtor-in-possession could
always contribute some unencumbered assets to the bankrupt estate, thereby
assuring the existence of a priority in both chapter 7 and chapter 11. But let
us suppose, for a moment, that the trade creditors' priority claim rests
exclusively on the section 723(a) cause of action in the hypothetical liquida-
tion proceeding to which section 1129(a)(7)(A) refers.
The obstacle to priority for the trade creditors comes form the fact that
section 723(a) has no parallel provision in chapter 11. That is, section
723(a) gives a chapter 7 trustee the right to pursue the general partners in
the name of the trade creditors, but it does not so clearly authorize a chapter
11 trustee or debtor-in-possession to pursue the general partners."
This fact might be seen to threaten the trade creditors' priority. If the
section 723(a) right does not exist in chapter 11, then the trade creditors
cannot gain this asset, and, thus, the trade creditors would once again be
equal to the artificial recourse creditors. And if they are equal, the argument
based on priority falls apart.
There are several replies to this objection. First, the objection does not
apply if the principals of the debtor-in-possession have contributed, or are
willing to contribute, unencumbered assets to the bankrupt estate. 6 Since
any contribution on unencumbered assets differentiates the artificial recourse
claim from the natural recourse claims, the objection that section 723(a)
does not exist in chapter 7 can be dismissed as an empty formalism.
Second, although section 723(a) does not exist in chapter 11, the trade
85. Robert Rosenberg, Partnership Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act:
Filling in the Interstices, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1201 (1981).
86. In In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1992), Judge Martin Teel confirmed a plan in which all creditors were enjoined against
collecting from participating general partners, in exchange for these partners' negotiated
contributions to the bankrupt estate. If a nonrecourse secured party had been involved,
these contributions would have constituted property that the trade creditors could reach,
but which the artificial recourse claimant could not.
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creditors may nevertheless be entitled to block a plan on the basis of section
1129(a)(7), even though the artificial recourse claimant cannot. If so, the
transaction costs retain a kind of priority even without the existence of an
unencumbered asset. For example, suppose the bankrupt estate has no
unencumbered assets and, in chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession cannot
claim to own an asset resembling the right in section 723(a). Nevertheless,
the trade creditors might still insist that, unless they receive what they would
have received in a hypothetical liquidation-i.e., the value of the section
723(a) action-they may block confirmation of the plan for failure to meet
the requirements of section 1129(a)(7)Y This argument, if accepted, proves
that the trade creditors have powers (if not priority to assets) that the
artificial recourse claimant does not have.
Third, it is possible that a chapter 11 trustee does own the section
723(a) cause of action after all. 8 If so, then the section 723(a) asset belongs
to the recourse creditors, but not to the artificial recourse claimant. The
argument that section 723(a) exists in chapter 11 might go as follows.
According to section 103(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, all parts of chapter
5-including section 541(a), which defines the bankrupt estate-apply to
chapter 11. According to section 541(a)(3), the chapter 11 estate includes
"Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section ...
723."89 Therefore, section 541(a)(3) supplies the chapter 11 debtor-in-
possession with rights under section 723(a). Or, alternatively, the trustee's
87. Bell Rd. Inv. Co. v. Arabians (In re Arabians), 103 B.R. 211, 216-17 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1989) (Russell, J.); In re Monetary Group, 55 B.R. 297,299 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985) (Proctor, J.); Frank R. Kennedy & Gerald K. Smith, Some Issues in Partnership
and Partner Bankruptcy Cases and Recommendations for Legislative Change, ANN.
Suiv. BANKR. L. 1, 22 (1990).
88. In In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1992), Judge Teel assumed that the chapter 11 estate owned a right similar to § 723(a).
In performing the hypothetical liquidation test of § 1129(a)(7), he counted the § 723(a)
right in valuing the hypothetical chapter 7 estate, and he also approved adding a similar
right in valuing the chapter 11 property distributed under the plan. Id. at 682. This right
(against partners who refused to contribute voluntarily to fund the plan) was deemed
assigned to a creditors' committee and was counted as a distribution under the chapter
11 plan for the benefit of the general creditors. Thus, the case stands for the proposition
that § 723(a) rights exist in chapter 11 as part of the bankrupt estate.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1988).
90. Commercial Bank v. Price (In re Notchcliff Assocs.), 139 B.R. 361, 370-71
(Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (Schneider, J.); Kennedy & Smith, supra note 87, at 22-25. This
last argument is weakened by the exact wording of § 723(a), which provides:
If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims
which are allowed in a case under this chapter concerning a partnership and
with respect to which a general partner of the partnership is personally liable,
the trustee shall have a claim against such general partner for the full amount
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strong-arm power under section 544(a) might imply the right of a debtor-in-
possession to pursue the general partners. 9' According to section 544(a):
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case ... the
rights and powers of...
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, ant that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor
on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether
or not such a creditor exists .... 92
This argument relies not on the judicial lien, but on the fact that the trustee
is deemed to have the powers of a creditor that extends credit to the debtor
at the time of the commencement of the case. Such a creditor would have
recourse against the general partners of the debtor, and so a debtor-in-
possession has recourse against the general partners by virtue of section
544(a).
For these reasons, the nonexistence of section 723(a) in chapter 11 is
no answer to the point that trade creditors with recourse outrank the
artificial recourse claim of a dominant secured creditor. Because of the high
priority of the trade claims, their separate classification from the artificial
recourse claim is compelled by the plain meaning of section 1122(a).
Accordingly, the classification veto does not exist in any case where the
dominant undersecured creditor has no recourse under state law.
B. The Section 1111(b) (2) Election
That nonrecourse claims and recourse claims have different priorities
in chapter 11 constitutes a powerful difference in legal priority. Therefore,
every case involving these factors not only can sustain separate classifica-
tion, but must sustain it. Furthermore, one can discover other differences in
priority in cases where the secured creditor has natural recourse stemming
from state law or where the debtor is not a partnership.
One of the more mysterious moments in chapter 11 is the difficult
section 1111(b)(2) election. Section 1111(b) provides that, if an under-
of the deficiency.
11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (emphasis added). Perhaps the emphasized language requires creditor
claims to be allowed under chapter 7. In chapter 11, no such allowed claims exist, and,
therefore, the chapter 11 trustee or debtor-in-possession can recover nothing under §
723(a).
91. Andrew v. Coopersmith (In re Downtown Inv. Club I), 89 B.R. 59 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1988) (Carlson, J.).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
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secured party so elects, "then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title,
such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed."93
This language is usually read to mean that if an undersecured creditor makes
the election, she forfeits any unsecured deficit claim.' 4 Hence, when a
secured creditor actually makes the election, there is no need to address the
classification issue at all.95 The unsecured claim is eliminated, and the total
claim of the dominant creditor is put in a single class.96 When this occurs,
no impediment exists to placing the happy trade creditors in their own class.
A numerical example will explain the consequences of the section
llll(b)(2) election as it is usually read. Suppose A has lent $1,000,000 to
the debtor. The collateral is worth $100,000. There are no liens other than
A's on the collateral. Therefore, A's secured claim has a section 506(a)
ceiling of $100,000; that is, A is deemed to have a totally secured claim of
$100,000 and an unsecured claim of $900,000. If the undersecured creditor
is qualified to make the section 1111(b) election, and actually does so elect,
the undersecured creditor must receive $1,000,000 under the chapter 11
plan, thereby gaining a preference of $900,000 over other general creditors.
While this effect may seem astonishing, it is tempered by section
1129(a)(7)(B), which permits a debtor-in-possession to provide the electing
secured creditor with a present value equal to the value of the collateral-in
93. Id. § 1111(b).
94. It is clear that nonrecourse lenders who are given recourse under § 111 l(b)(1)(A)
should lose it, but it is less clear that recourse lenders who make the election should also
forfeit their right to the unsecured deficit claim. Nevertheless, the proposition is
universally asserted. In re Cook, 126 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1991) (Ecker, J.);
In re North Indianapolis Venture, 113 B.R. 386, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (Sellers,
J.); In re Waterways Barge Partnership, 104 B.R. 776, 782 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989);
In re Western Preferred Corp., 58 B.R. 201,210 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re Union
Square Assocs., 53 B.R. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); In re Southern Mo. Towing
Serv., Inc., 35 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Griffiths, 27 B.R. 873,
876 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); Provident Bank v. BBT (In re BBT), 11 B.R. 224, 231
n.12, 237 n.20 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1111.02[5]
(Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. 1993); Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured
Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 965
(1985); Michael J. Kaplan, Nonrecourse Undersecured Creditors Under New Chapter
11-The Section 1111(b) Election: Already aNeedfor Change, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269,
270 (1979).
For the view that only nonrecourse lenders should lose the recourse promised in §
1111 (b)(1)(A), see Carlson, supra note 63.
95. In re Miami Ctr. Assocs., 144 B.R. 937, 943 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (Cristol,
J.).
96. The placement of the total undersecured claim in one class is not permitted unless
the § 1111(b)(2) election is made. See 266 Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re
Washington Assocs.), 147 B.R. 827, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Dearie, J.).
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our example, $100,000. According to section 1129(a)(7)(B):
With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
(B) if section 1111(b)(2) ...applies .... each holder of a claim...
will receive or retain. . . property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in the property that secures such claims. 7
The benefit of the section 1111(b) election can therefore be eviscerated by
an easy arithmetical trick. A debtor-in-possession must pay $1,000,000, but
it may extend the length of the payout so that the value of $1,000,000 over
time is really worth only $100,000. Accordingly, "what the section 1111 (b)
election giveth (a $900,000 preference), arithmetical manipulation (an
extremely long payout) taketh away.""8
In In re Bjolmes Realty Trust" Judge James Queenan ruled that the
unsecured deficit is inherently different from trade debt and may always be
classified in a different manner, because the undersecured party has the right
to its section 1111 (b) election.'0° Because of the election, the undersecured
party could change its unsecured claim into a secured claim at will.
One criticism of the view that a potential section 1111(b)(2) election
always justifies separate classification of an unsecured deficit claim is that
an undersecured creditor might make an early election. If this election is
viewed as irreversible, then Judge Queenan's remarks lose some of their
force. 10' For example, in In re D & W Realty Corp."° the secured creditor
represented to Judge Prudence Abram that it would not make the election.
According to some authorities, section 1111(b)(2) elections are reversible
until a debtor-in-possession changes its position in reliance on the secured
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B) (emphasis added).
98. Carlson, supra note 63, at 255.
99. 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
100. Id. at 1004; accord In re Creekside Landing Ltd., 140 B.R. 713, 715 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1992) (Lundin, J.); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1989) (Lundin, J.) (disapproving plan on other grounds); Anderson, supra note 21,
at 125. This reasoning has been rejected in favor of Greystone by other Massachusetts
judges. In re Cranberry Hill Assocs., 150 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (Kenner,
J.); In re L.G. Salem Partnership, 140 B.R. 932, 935 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Hillman,
J.); In re Cantonwood Assocs., 138 B.R. 648, 655 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Goodman,
J.); see also In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(Bechtle, J.).
101. Cf. In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1017 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993) (Brozman, J.) (suggesting classification could not be resolved until the election was
made).
102. 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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creditor's choice.' Therefore, if the secured creditor is willing to state
definitively that it will not make the election, then the mere possibility of
election can no longer be relied upon as a reason to classify the unsecured
deficit claim separately.
However, Judge Abram did not see it this way. She ruled that the
election mandates separate classification, even after the election has
definitively been made. Observing that section 1111(b) allows a class to
make the election," 4 Abram theorized that placing a dominant unsecured
deficit claim in the same class as the trade creditors would subject the trade
creditors to the section 111 l(b)(2) election-an absurd result. According to
section 111l(b)(2), "if such an election is made, then notwithstanding
section 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that
such claim is allowed.""05 In other words, trade creditors would become
secured creditors if the election is made. Their unsecured claims would
disappear." 6 Yet, section 1129(a)(7)(B) would guarantee the "electing"
trade creditors the value of their collateral, which is zero because they are
unsecured creditors. As a result, trade creditors would lose all rights to a
bankruptcy dividend if the class of unsecured creditors to which the
unsecured deficit claim belongs insists on making the section 111 (b)(2)
election.
The weakness in this argument is that the secured creditor had already
promised that it would not make the election-as well it might, since the
election is rarely rational." 7 Given that any possibility of election has
103. Under Bankruptcy Rule 3014, a secured party may make the § 111l(b)(2)
election "at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing on the disclosure statement
or within such later time as the court may fix." According to Judge William Thinnes: "A
material alteration of the Plan by the debtor is tantamount to filing a different plan and
if a material alteration is made it would be inequitable not to allow a creditor to fully
evaluate the proposal and determine whether it wished to elect treatment under §
1111(b)." In re Keller, 47 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); see also In re RBS
Indus., 115 B.R. 419, 421 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (Shiff, J.). However, Judge
Thirmes thought that if the plan has not been materially altered, the election is reversible.
Keller, 47 B.R. at 730; accord In re Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961, 970-74
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (Barliant, J.); In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 547,
553-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (Drake, J.).
104. Sections 1111 (b)(1)(A)(i), 1111 (b)(1)(B) and 1129(a)(7)(B) all make reference to
class voting. See also BANKR. R. 3014 (referring to class voting).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988).
106. D & WRealty, 156 B.R. at 144 ("In the event the election is made, there is no
unsecured claim."). That the unsecured claim of an electing creditor disappears is
universally assumed. Yet, it is not absolutely required by the text of the Bankruptcy
Code. For criticism of this assumption of disappearance, see Carlson, supra note 63, at
282-85.
107. As the election is usually read, an electing undersecured creditor loses the
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disappeared, the absurdity that Judge Abram fears has also disappeared.
Abram, however, was satisfied that in general the structure of the
Bankruptcy Code requires the availability of the election until the plan is
actually written. Only then do we know which classes of creditors are
entitled to the election.' Therefore, plans in general must always classify
the unsecured deficit claim separately from the trade creditors. This implied
requirement of separate classification effectively negates the dominant
creditor veto that section 1129(a)(10) might otherwise imply.
On this argument, the actual willingness of an undersecured creditor to
commit against making the election is irrelevant because structurally the
Bankruptcy Code contemplates in general that the election might be made
up until a time very late in the proceeding. On the same argument, however,
the undersecured creditor's commitment to vote no on a plan might similarly
be ignored because structurally the Bankruptcy Code in general allows
voting very late in the proceeding. Judge Abram, then, would never let a
dominant veto be exercised by a motion to lift the automatic stay, because
the structure of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be overridden by an early
representation of a no vote.
In any case, even if a bankruptcy judge will not listen to the under-
secured creditor's assurance that the section 1111(b)(2) election will never
be made, in some cases, the section 1111(b)(2) election will not be
available. For example, if the plan calls for the collateral to be sold or
abandoned, creditors with recourse under state law are not eligible for the
election.'0 9 Nor can any undersecured creditors elect if, for them, the
collateral has "inconsequential value."" 0 In such cases, the section
unsecured deficit, and with it a possible veto over the plan per § 1129(a)(10). The
electing undersecured creditor also loses a dividend on the unsecured claim and, under
the orthodox interpretation of the election, does not even obtain any appreciation value
in the collateral that might accrue, unless the plan is in default. Therefore, the election
is almost never advisable. See Carlson, supra note 63, at 291-300.
108. D & WRealty, 156 B.R. at 145 ("That a vote on the Code § 1111(b) election
cannot be required before the plan and disclosure statement are filed supports the position
that the plan must be drafted to permit the election to be made in the future.").
109. This follows by negative implication of § 1111 (b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides that
the election is not available to "the holder of a claim [who] has recourse against the
debtor on account of such claim and such property is sold under section 363 of this title
or is to be sold under this plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii). That the section
1111(b)(2) election is unavailable if the collateral is to be abandoned is controversial. See
generally Carlson, supra note 63, at 287 n.99.
110. "A class of claims may not elect ... if-(i) the interest on account of such
claims of the holders of such claims in such property is of inconsequential value . .. ."
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(i). For a case rejecting separate classification when an
underwater lender was ineligible for the election, see In re SM 104 Ltd., No. 92-22698-
BKC-AJC, 1993 WL 366619, *11-12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 1993) (Ginsburg, J.);
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111 l(b)(2) election will not justify separate classification of the unsecured
deficit.
The idea that a potential section 111 l(b)(2) election distinguishes the
unsecured deficit claim as a matter of rank is ironic because, in the view of
Judge Edith Jones in Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Greystone III
Joint Venture (In re Greystone 111 Joint Venture),"' the purpose of the
section 1111(b)(2) election-or, rather, the purpose of not making the
election and accepting a recourse unsecured deficit claim instead' 2-is to
create a veto for the undersecured creditor. Unlike Judge Queenan, who
thinks that the section 1111 (b)(2) election justifies separate classification and
therefore loss of the veto, Judge Jones thinks section 111 1(b)(2) proves the
veto should exist:
The purpose of § 1111(b) is to provide an undersecured creditor an
election with respect to the treatment of its deficiency claim. Generally,
the creditor may elect recourse status and obtain the right to vote in the
unsecured class, or it may elect to forego recourse to gain an allowed
secured claim for the entire amount of the debt. If separate classification
of unsecured deficiency claims arising from non-recourse debt were
permitted solely on the ground that the claim is non-recourse under state
law, the right to vote in the unsecured class would be meaningless. Plan
proponents could effectively disenfranchise the holders of such claims
by placing them in a separate class and confirming the plan over their
objections by cramdown. With its unsecured voting rights effectively
eliminated, the electing creditor's ability to negotiate a satisfactory
settlement of either its secured or unsecured claims would be seriously
undercut. It seems likely that the creditor would often have to "elect"
to take an allowed secured claim under § 1111(b)(2) in the hopes that
the value of the collateral would increase after the case is closed. Thus,
the election under § 1111(b) would be essentially meaningless. We
believe Congress did not intend this result. "
3
This view expressed by Judge Jones may be criticized from several
perspectives. First, if separate classification is allowed, the dominant
In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1015-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Brozman, J.).
111. 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(1)(A) (changing non-electing undersecured nonrecourse
creditors into recourse creditors).
113. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279-80 (emphasis added); accord 680 Fifth Ave. Assoc.
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 156 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Conrad, J.); In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1021
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Brozman, J.); In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421, 427
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers, C.J.).
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undersecured creditor is not disenfranchised.114 The secured party still
votes. The issue is whether a dominant creditor should be able to "veto" a
chapter 11 by outvoting the other general creditors." 5 If the unsecured
deficit claim of the dominant secured creditor is placed in a separate class,
the creditor still may vote the deficit claim and therefore is not disenfran-
chised. By voting no, the creditor obtains cram-down rights, which is the
true significance of voting.
Second, Judge Jones assumes that separate classification must be illegal
because it cuts down the power of the dominant creditor in any settlement
negotiation. But this presupposes the very conclusion for which this remark
is supposed to serve as an argument. Whether an undersecured creditor
deserves so much power is precisely the question. 6
114. One recent commentator goes so far to use the very title of his article to assert
this criticism. See Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through
Artificial Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281 (1992).
Meltzer writes:
[I]t is impossible to permit separate classification of these claims without
acknowledging that the sole purpose for doing so is to circumvent §
1129(a)(10) of the Code and to disenfranchise the dissenting lender in the
process. Interpreting one Code provision (§ 1122) in such a manner so as to
eradicate completely the effects of another (§ 1129(a)(10)) can hardly be
considered sound reasoning.
Id. at 303. It is inaccurate to say that flexible classification "disenfranchises" the
dominant secured creditor. Such a creditor still gets to vote. In fact, it gets to vote
twice-once as a secured creditor and once as an unsecured creditor. True, this creditor
is effectively deprived of a veto, but this same creditor is still entitled to vote. Any voter
who feels disenfranchised because she is not given a complete blackball right is taking
a rather egotistical attitude toward her own importance.
Also, if one accepts, as Meltzer does not, that creditors with different economic
interests are entitled to be in different classes for the purposes of § 1129(a)(10), then it
is wrong to say that § 1129(a)(10) is being illegitimately circumvented. Rather, the plan
will have legitimately met the demand that § 1129(a)(10) imposes.
115. Thus, in In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993),
Judge Tina Brozman defends the veto because it "comports with the democratic voting
power that the Code gives the majority of any class claims." 1d. at 1021. In fact, there
is nothing democratic at all about this veto; rather, it is dictatorial, allowing one creditor
to make decisions at the expense of other creditors.
116. According to Peter Meltzer, the purpose of § 1129(a)(10) is to encourage the
debtor to negotiate; but if gerrymandering is allowed, then negotiation is unnecessary.
Meltzer, supra note 114, at 319-20. In fact, it is not that negotiation is unnecessary, but
admittedly negotiation becomes a lot easierfor the debtor if other creditors are less angry
and more cooperative than the dominant secured creditor. Who has power in a
negotiation will turn on whether separate classificitions are allowed. That a dominant
secured creditor is weakened by separate classification is no argument against it, but
rather simply restates the legal result that is being challenged.
Meltzer quotes another commentator as saying: "Classification schemes should
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And third, if Judge Queenan is correct, and Judge Jones is wrong, the
section 1111(b)(2) election-or more precisely, the recourse afforded in case
the election is not made-is far from meaningless. Rather, the non-election
guarantees a nonrecourse lender a general dividend on the recourse deficit
claim that is thereby awarded. It always guarantees the dominant creditor the
power of the absolute priority rule. Thus, Judge Clark, in his opinion in
Greystone, specifically denied that section 111 l(b)(1)(A) was passed with an
eye toward making section 1129(a)(10) difficult to achieve. Rather, he
thought that section 1111(b)(1)(A) existed only to ensure that the under-
secured creditor would have the cram-down rights of an unsecured creditor
as well as those of a secured creditor."1
7
C. The Right to Accruing Cash Collateral
Other differences of rank may be located, separate from what section
111 1(b)(2) implies. Under the Supreme Court's much criticized opinion in
Dewsnup v. Timm," 8 a subdivision of the total claim of an undersecured
creditor cannot be final until a chapter 11 plan is confirmed (and even then
the section 111 l(b)(2) election, if made, repeals the bifurcation in a plan).
Therefore, it follows that any unsecured claim might enjoy a change in rank
if appreciation value accrues. Such a claim always enjoys the potential of
being secured-an improvement in rank denied to other secured creditors.
This is especially poignant whenever the undersecured party claims a
security interest in cash income from collateral (as in a real estate case
where the mortgage encumbers the rents). In such a case, the unsecured
deficit is in a constant state of shrinking, as collateral continues to accrue.
This shrinkage can easily be characterized as a matter of rank, justifying
separate classification." 9 Indeed, it may as well be pointed out that, given
generally seek to foster reorganization efforts within the structures of the absolute
priority doctrine and the unfair discrimination doctrine." Anderson, supra note 21, at
127. Meltzer responds:
The problem with this statement is that, since the author had already
concluded that deficiency claims may be separately classified from the general
unsecured trade claims ... [o]ne may infer that, in his opinion, such separate
classification is within the strictures of the absolute priority and unfair dis-
crimination doctrines. Unfortunately, this puts the rabbit in the hat.
Meltzer, supra note 114, at 306. Yet, Mr. Meltzer is just as guilty of presupposition.
Having concluded that dominant secured creditors utterly deserve their veto, he too has
put his own rabbit into the hat.
117. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 569 n.11.
118. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) (Blackmun, J.). For criticism, see Margaret Howard,
Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 513 (1992).
119. Peter Meltzer, who favors the "priority" view of classification that Judge
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enough time, the undersecured creditor's vaunted classification veto will
disappear because the undersecured creditor is destined eventually to become
an oversecured creditor, as cash accrues. 12 The Greystone veto is purely a
temporary phenomenon. 121
To be sure, the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan bifurcates under-
secured claims (unless the undersecured creditor makes the section
1111(b)(2) election). Bifurcation effectively disencumbers the income
stream, so long as the plan does not go into default. That is to say, so long
as the plan is in effect, the debtor probably can use the cash proceeds as if
they were unencumbered. But, in any case where the undersecured creditor
receives payment over time, the undersecured creditor must also "retain the
liens securing such claims.""' This analysis implies that, after confirma-
tion, the rents are still encumbered even while the plan itself prevents
foreclosures or collections on the collateral. And, in any case, postcon-
firmation rights should never be considered as a justification for separate
classification; rather, only preconfirmation rights should be considered."
Thanks to Dewsnup v. Timm, the unsecured deficit claim of a dominant
creditor will usually enjoy the potential of accruing cash collateral, which
Queenan propounds, nevertheless thinks that only two kinds of priorities exist: secured
priorities and unsecured priorities. According to Meltzer, "it makes no sense to presume
that a dollar owed to a trade creditor is somehow different from a dollar owed to an
undersecured lender or any other unsecured creditor." Meltzer, supra note 114, at 301.
Furthermore, he points out that § 506(a) "does not make any distinction between this
kind of unsecured claim and any other kind of unsecured claim." Id. Obviously, Queenan
takes the position that secured versus unsecured does not exhaust the universe of
priorities in the world.
Meltzer's view is also disproved by subordinated unsecured debt. Under Meltzer's
argument, subordinated debentures cannot be separately classified because this priority
is not recognized in § 506(a). Yet, clearly subordination agreements profoundly affect
classification. See generally Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification
and Voting Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1982).
120. As happened, for example, in In re Landing Associates, 157 B.R. 791, 798 n.1
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (Clark, J.).
121. In re Bloomingdale Partners, 155 B.R. 961, 976 n.11 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)
(Barliant, J.). For cases where the erosion of the classification veto actually occurred,
see In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 141 B.R. 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); In re Club
Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (Murphy, J.). It should have occurred
as well in In re Birdneck Apt. Assocs., II L.P., 156 B.R. 499, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1993), but Judge Douglas Tice ruled that the surrender of cash collateral did not reduce
the unsecured deficit claim, but rather had to be characterized as postpetition inter-
est-even though undersecured creditors are not supposed to receive postpetition interest
under the holding of United Says. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forrest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1988).
123. See infra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
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should justify separate classification.
D. Subordination Agreements
Another possible justification, based on rank, for separate classification
might come from some explicit or implicit subordination agreement.
Although few dominant undersecured creditors, after taking a mortgage, will
have subordinated themselves outright to general creditors, 2 4 many
mortgage agreements permit the payment of some trade creditors before
payment of the mortgage. Could this agreement to forego payment in favor
those who improve or maintain the collateral count as a matter of "rank,"
as a subordination agreement clearly would?
In an early anti-gerrymandering case, In re Pine Lake Village
Apartment Co., 2 Judge Howard Schwartzberg thought not. The secured
creditor in Pine Lake had agreed to the following:
Interest shall be payable monthly out of Net Cash Flow .... If,
however ... rental and other income ... after payment of the
operating expenses (the Net Cash Flow) is insufficient to pay interest
... the amount by which said interest exceeds Net Cash Flow shall
accrue .... The accrued interest, mentioned above, shall not be
grounds for foreclosure .... At the Maturity Date, the entire unpaid
balance of principal and interest accrued and unpaid hereunder shall
become due and payable. 126
In other words, if rental income fell, the debtor was authorized to defer
interest payments and let them accrue. Judge Schwartzberg thought that this
right did not constitute subordination:
The so-called subordination language ... clearly expresses an
understanding that if the Net Cash Flow (including payments to trade
creditors) exceeds the monthly interest obligation due the mortgagee, the
excess interest amount shall accrue, but such unpaid interest shall be due
and payable at maturity. This language merely postpones unavailable
monthly interest in favor of operating expenses. There is no hint of any
intention to subordinate the mortgagee's principal indebtedness to the
claims of trade creditors. Indeed, the interest is not forgiven, it is
merely postponed to maturity when "the entire unpaid balance of
124. Even this is not unknown. Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 657 F.2d 495, 502 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Moore, J.) (subordinated creditor had valid security interest, so that only the
unsecured deficit was subordinated).
125. 19 B.R. 819, 830 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
126. Id. at 830.
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principal and interest accrued and unpaid . . . shall become due and
payable." Accordingly, the debtor's contention that the mortgagee
contractually subordinated his claim for principal and interest under the
matured and defaulted mortgage to the claims of trade creditors is
without merit.127
According to Judge Schwartzberg, then, the quoted clause simply changes
the maturity date for interest payments; this does not constitute subordina-
tion.
What then is subordination? According to one study, subordination of
one debt to another is an assignment of a bankruptcy dividend by the junior
creditor as security for the senior debt. Under this view, the junior creditor
is surety for the senior debt." These assignments are usually contingent,
such that prior to the stated contingency the junior creditor is free to receive
payment. 29 After the contingency, the junior creditor must return all
payments received to the senior creditor to whom they belong. 30 Finally,
another key idea of debt subordination is that the senior creditors have
privity of contract with the junior creditors-either directly or through a
third-party beneficiary theory.'
Changing the maturity date for interest due is not subordination under
this definition. The clause in question merely changed the maturity date that
bankruptcy automatically accelerates. 3 2 Once accelerated, this claim then
stands as equal vis-A-vis other unsecured claims.
One factor overlooked in Pine Lake was that the mortgagee's claim
might be considered unimpaired, because no interest was due and owing so
long as trade creditors were not paid. According to section 1124(2), a claim
is not impaired if the debtor
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the
commencement of the case under this title, other than a default of the a
kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title [i.e., an ipso facto
clause];
127. Id. at 831.
128. David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien
Priority, 38 VAND. L. REV. 975, 978 (1985) ("[S]ubordination of the junior claim is an
assignment by a nonrecourse guarantor in order to secure a senior claim.").
129. Id. at 983-86.
130. Id. 993-96.
131. See Jessica A. Hauser, Note, Nonconsensual Repeal of Third-Party Beneficiary
ContractRights: Senior Creditors Under Subordination Agreements, 8 CARDOZo L. REV.
1227 (1987).
132. This is accomplished in 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) ("[The court ... shall determine
the amount of such claim... as of the date of the filing of the petition. .. ").
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(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity
existed before such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim for any damages incurred
as a result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such contractual
provision or such applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable or contractual rights
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or
interest.133
If interest was not due because rental income had fallen below the sum of
trade claims plus debt service, then the debtor possibly could have reinstated
the maturity of such interest rates through negative amortization.' 34 Under
this view, the mortgagee, so treated, would not even have an impaired claim
and hence no right even to vote on the plan, much less to be classified with
trade creditors for the purpose of voting. 
3 5
IV. RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS
A. Greystone
Some courts insist that only matters of priority or rank justify separate
classification. 36 But surprisingly, Greystone, which is cited as if it
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2).
134. See In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (imposing
negative amortization in chapter 11 plan where prepetition contract called for it), appeal
dismissed, 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1992).
135. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 125:
Since a reorganization envisions ongoing operations, and since the [Pine Lake]
mortgagee was postponed in satisfaction to claims of trade creditors, this
would appear to be a reasonable case where the trade creditors were entitled
to full payment before the mortgagee and that this would further appear to
justify both separate classification and separate treatment under a reorganiza-
tion plan.
136. In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1003 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). In
Bjolmes Judge Queenan felt bound by Granada Wines, Inc. v. New England Teamsters
& Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 748 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1984), where Judge Coffin ruled
that "all creditors of equal rank with claims against the same property shall be placed in
the same class." Id. at 46. But Queenan also criticized the Granada Wines dictum for
relying on old chapter X cases, when chapter XI had a more flexible rule. Whether §
1122 was intended to follow the chapter X or the chapter XI rule is unclear. See supra
text accompanying notes 38-45.
Judge Queenan also ruled that the artificial recourse claim is inherently one of
different priority, because of the § 1111 (b)(2) election. Not only was this distinction one
of rank, by the election created practical advantages as well-even though practical
differences could not be considered. According to Judge Queenan:
This distinction is not a technicality without significant practical aspects.
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represented a per se rule against separate classification of trade creditors and
the artificial recourse claim,'37 takes a more liberal position. According to
the judges at all levels of the case, mere practical differences that do not rise
to the level of difference in priority will suffice to justify separate classifica-
tion. What the judges did not agree on was whether, in the case, practical
differences had been successfully located.
In the Greystone plan, the debtor proposed to pay the trade claims and
the mortgagee, as holder of an unsecured deficit claim, slightly over three
cents on the dollar.'38 For our purposes, the crucial part of the plan was
that the trade creditors and the unsecured claim of the mortgagee were
placed in different voting classes. As a result, the trade creditors voted yes
on the plan, but the mortgagee voted no.'3 9 Hence, the requirements of
section 1129(a)(10) were ostensibly met-at least one impaired class of
creditors had voted in favor of the plan.
Although Judge Leif Clark satisfied himself that the beer of creative
classification cohered with the sausage of legislative history, 140 he also
The FDIC's mortgage interest greatly influences the manner in which it will
vote its unsecured claim. This became obvious at the hearing when the FDIC
indicated that it would vote its claim against the plan in order to strengthen
its case for terminating the automatic stay now preventing it from foreclosing
on the building. Holders of trade claims would receive nothing from the
foreclosure and little if anything from liquidation of the Debtor's other assets,
consisting primarily of equipment. Thus, they would likely vote in favor of
the plan. The potential held by the FDIC's unsecured claim for a difference
in legal rank with the trade debt is therefore an indication of very real
differences in these debts.
This is no bad faith gerrymandering of the votes of the unsecured. In light
of the heavy linkage in law and fact between the FDIC's secured and
unsecured claims, its unsecured claim is that in name only. No policy
concerns require that it dilute, here dominate, the vote of those truly acting
in their interests as unsecured creditors.
Bjolmes, 134 B.R. at 1003-04.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
138. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 561.
139. Taking no chances, the debtor actually put the trade creditors into two different
classes, lest one class vote no. Judge Clark did not allow this distinction and ordered all
trade creditors to be considered in a single class. See Greystone, 127 B.R. at 139-40.
The debtor-in-possession also set up separate classes for tenants who had supplied rent
deposits. Later, on appeal, Judge Edith Jones would rule that the tenants could not be
considered creditors at all because the debtor had assumed all the leases under § 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Greystone, 955 F.2d at 1281. Another class contained a claim for
ad valorem taxes. Apparently, the tax creditor was not impaired and hence could not vote
(or at least the debtor did not claim so when badly in need of an impaired yes-voting
class.) Therefore, if § 1129(a)(10) was met, it was by virtue of the yes vote by the trade
creditors.
140. For a discussion of Judge Clark's historical analysis, see supra text accompanying
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denounced classification solely for the purpose of generating a yes-voting
class to satisfy section 1129(a) (10).1 41 Clark stated: "If we take as a given
that some independent reasonable grounds for separate classification must
be found in order to authorize the classification scheme, then one recognized
rationale is a demonstrated economic need to treat certain otherwise similar
claims differently. "142 The key, then, was to find practical reasons why
the trade claims should be classified differently from the unsecured deficit
claim of the dominant undersecured creditor.
Before we examine the reasons that Judge Clark actually located,
remember that separate classification was not only permissible in Greystone,
but mandatory. This conclusion is compelled by the observation made
earlier: that the trade claims have a high priority, and the artificial recourse
claim a low priority, in a chapter 11 proceeding. 
43
This fundamental point was overlooked by Judge Clark. Yet he still
managed to find other reasons to support separate classification. He
emphasized that the trade creditors had claims with different legal character-
istics; they collect from the general partners of the debtor, but the dominant
secured party-whose recourse came solely from section 111 1(b)(1)(A)-
could not.'" This was not quite the same as saying that in chapter 11 the
nonrecourse claim and the trade claims have different priorities. Indeed, the
Greystone plan itself treated these claims identically, paying each type of
creditor only three cents on the dollar."' 5
The "practical" difference that Judge Clark relied on, then, was the fact
that, outside the plan, the general partners would pay off the trade creditors
in full.'46 Whether rights against an insider surety-without the aid of the
priority difference developed above-justifies separate classification is a
notes 49-73.
141. Clark did not exactly embrace this proposition warmly. He criticized the original
anti-gerrymandering case, In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 B.R. 819, 829-30
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Schwartzberg, J.), calling its underpinnings "shaky." He also cited
In re Sun Country Development, Inc., 764 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1985) (Reavley, J.),
for the proposition that a plan is in good faith so long as it is proposed with the
legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize and is not otherwise prohibited by law.
142. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 569.
143. This idea was developed supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
144. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 570.
145. It is possible to characterize the plan differently. If, as some courts believe, the
bankrupt estate inherently owns the right to pursue the general partners on behalf of the
trade creditors, and if the plan permits the trade creditors to fend for themselves outside
the plan, then the estate had essentially abandoned property rights to the trade creditors.
In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 682 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992(
(Teel, J.). Accordingly, the trade creditors in fact received more than the artificial
recourse claimant-and under the plan!
146. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 570.
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difficult question in general. In Greystone the general partners were, of
course, insiders. Insider votes must by ignored for purposes of section
1129(a)(10), by the express terms of that provision. If insiders are
subrogated to the rights of outside creditors, arguably, the votes of those
creditors should be entirely ignored for section 1129(a)(10) purposes. That
is, far from not justifying separate classification, suretyship from an insider
might disqualify the assured creditors from voting at all-at least insofar as
section 1129(a)(10) is concerned.147
However, this thought should ultimately be rejected. At least in
Greystone, the dominant secured creditor was junior to the trade claims
under section 1129(a)(7), which incorporates by reference the priorities of
chapter 7, where the dominant nonrecourse secured creditor would have no
claim at all.
The second practical reason developed by Judge Clark is that trade
creditors supposedly get ornery when not paid. Judge Clark thought
different classification for trade creditors would therefore improve the
business climate for the reorganized debtor. 4 '
On appeal District Court Judge Walter Smith found that these business
reasons for separate classification were findings of fact within the discretion
of the lower court 4 9-a position that other courts have taken.- 0
147. This idea is, however, further exacerbated by the thought that general partners,
subrogated to the rights of the trade creditors, would be subrogated to all other
partnership creditors in the partnership bankruptcy. This is so as a matter of state
partnership law. UNIF. PARTNERSmP ACT § 40(b), 6 U.L.A. 469 (1969). Accordingly,
the general partners have special private motivation to ensure that the recourse creditors
are well treated, further making suspect the votes of the recourse creditors in chapter 11.
148. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 570; accord AMFAC Dist. Corp. v. Wolff (In re Wolff),
22 B.R. 510, 512 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (but ruling that the debtor failed
to prove that happy trade creditors made a difference in that case). Discriminations in
favor of trade creditors were approved early in the history of the Chandler Act. See In
re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
149. Greystone, 127 B.R. at 141. In addition, the undersecured creditor pointed out
that at the confirmation hearing the debtor had orally modified the plan to delete
reference to payment of the trade creditors by the partners. This, according to the
appellant, repealed the trade creditor vote in favor of the plan, so that § 1129(a)(10) was
not met after all. Judge Smith avoided this embarrassment by ruling that the tenants, an
impaired class, also voted in favor of the plan. Id. at 143. But, as mentioned earlier,
Judge Edith Jones would rule that these tenants were not creditors at all because their
leases had been assumed by the debtor. See supra note 139. In any case, because the
deleted portion of the plan simply repeated the state-law rights of the trade creditors to
pursue the general partners of the debtor, the deletion should not have been considered
important enough to mandate a new vote by the trade creditors.
150. E.g., Bustop Shelters of Louisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 914 F.2d 810,
813 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy, J.) (upholding judge's rejection of debtor's classification);
Hanson v. First Bank, 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (Wollman, J.); Teamsters
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The court of appeals reversed, however, because it felt the classification
was motivated solely by the illegitimate desire to manipulate the voting
results. "[T]hou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to
gerrymander," declaimed Judge Edith Jones.' But, notwithstanding this
memorable sound bite, Judge Jones indicated that, if the debtor could offer
genuine reasons for the classification (other than pure gerrymandering), the
classification might be upheld. 52 In this sense, as Judge Jones acknowl-
edged, her position was not different from that of the overruled Judge
Clark. 1
53
The real meaning of the reversal is that Judge Jones found wanting the
reasons proffered by Judge Clark to justify separate classification. But her
understanding of those reasons was not always lucid. She understood Clark
to be presenting three reasons. First, she wrote that "[tihe alleged distinction
between the legal attributes of the unsecured claims is that under state law
[the mortgagee] has no recourse against the debtor personally. However,
state law is irrelevant where, as here, the Code has eliminated the legal
distinction between non-recourse deficiency claims and other unsecured
claims."154 This, of course, mischaracterizes Clark's opinion.
Clark obviously saw that both classes had recourse against the debtor.
Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800
F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.). After Judge Jones's reversal in Greystone,
one case nevertheless still emphasized that classification was an issue consigned to the
discretion of the bankruptcy court. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re
Bryson Props., XVII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.) (Restani, J.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 191 (1992).
151. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279.
152. Id. ("[Cilassification may only be undertaken for reasons independent of the
debtor's motivation to secure the vote of an impaired, assenting class of claims."); see
In re Kliegl Bros. Univ. Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1992) (Holland, J.) (reading Judge Jones's opinion in this way). For example, in
Heartland Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd., II (In re Briscoe
Enterprises, Ltd., nI), 994 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993), the city of Forth Worth invested
in a real estate project as a junior creditor. When the debtor classified the senior
unsecured deficit differently from the unsecured claim of the city, the dominant creditor
protested that its veto had been gerrymandered away. Judge John Minor Wisdom upheld
the plan, however, because the city had public motives different from the purely private
motives of the dominant secured creditor. "We emphasize the narrowness of this
holding," he cautioned. "In many bankruptcies, the proffered reasons as in Greystone
will be insufficient to warrant separate classification. Here it seems justified." Id. at
1167; see also T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v. Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. (In
re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership), 5 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1993) (DeMoss, J.)
(reversing bankruptcy court because it did not give debtor opportunity to add reasons for
separate classifications after confirmation was initially refused).
153. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279.
154. Id.
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Clark's point was that the trade creditors had recourse against the general
partners of the debtor, whereas the mortgagee did not. Hence, Jones's
reversal may have been based on a misunderstanding. 55
Judge Jones also read Clark as holding that gerrymandering was
always justified if absolutely necessary to achieve cram down:
As the bankruptcy court viewed this issue, the debtor's ability to
155. For the identical misunderstanding, see Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership), 968 F.2d 647 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Wollman, J.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson
Props., XVII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.) (Restani, J.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191
(1992); Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd.
Partnership), 154 B.R. 617, 622 n.3 (D. Conn. 1993) (Nevas, J.); In re 499 W. Warren
St. Assocs., 151 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Gerling, J.); In re Main Rd.
Props., Inc., 144 B.R. 217, 220 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (Votolato, J.); In re 266
Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 284 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Feller, J.), aff'd sub
nom. 266 Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington Assocs.), 147 B.R.
827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 299. In John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Roswell-Hannover Joint Venture (In re Roswell-Hannover Joint Venture),
149 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992), Judge Joyce Bihary seems to have comprehend-
ed Judge Clark's point, but rejected the distinction as insufficient to justify separate
classification. See id. at 1020.
A different kind of case is In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Brozman, J.), in which both the dominant undersecured creditor and
an even more junior would-be secured creditor were nonrecourse. Neither creditor had
recourse against the general partner of the debtor; thus, the court properly found no
distinction between the two unsecured claims to justify separate classification.
A particularly mystifying dismissal of Judge Clark's point occurs in John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993):
The reliance on state law is curious since [the secured party] moved for
relief from the automatic stay in order to pursue its state-law rights and the
debtor opposed the motion in order to prevent [the secured party] from doing
so. In any event, we cannot accept this justification because it begs the
relevant question: why is this a reasonable scheme for measuring creditors'
votes? The debtor's explanation, based on the rights that [the secured party]
would have under state law if freed from the strictures of the Bankruptcy
Code, is entirely beside the point.
Id. at 161. It is difficult to explain in just a few words why a view as foolish and
confused as this one is defective. Suffice it to say that Judge Clark does not beg the
question of whether classification is reasonable. He answers it by showing that the state-
law rights of the creditors are substantially different, and these changes would affect the
way these creditors would vote their claims.
All of the above cases involved unsecured deficit claims created artificially by §
111 l(b)(1)(A). Because such claims have a lower priority than do recourse claims (by
virtue of § 1129(a)(7)), all of the above cases were wrongly decided. In each case,
separate classification was not only permissible, but compelled.
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achieve a cramdown plan should be preferred over the creditor's §
1111(b) election rights because of the Code's policy of facilitating
reorganization. The bankruptcy court resorted to policy considerations
because it believed Congress did not foresee the potential impact of an
electing creditor's deficiency claim on the debtor's aspiration to
cramdown a plan.
15 6
Jones viewed the desire for cram down insufficient to justify separate
classification of the trade creditors,5 7 but this too shows a misunderstanding
of Clark's opinion. By his historical argument, Judge Clark had tried to
establish that section 1129(a)(10) did not block flexible classifications under
section 1122.
In the end, Clark reached the same conclusion that Jones did-there
must be a reason, other than pure gerrymandering, for a classification that
nullifies the undersecured party's veto of a single-asset cram down. Judge
Clark's preference for cram down over the "hyper-technical (and largely
156. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1280.
157. According to Judge Jones:
We disagree with this approach for three reasons. First, it results here in
violating § 1122, by gerrymandering the plan vote, for the sake of allegedly
effectuating a § 1129(b) cramdown .... Second, as shown, it virtually
eliminates the § 1111(b) election for secured creditors in this type of case.
Third, the bankruptcy court's concern for the viability of cramdown plans is
overstated. If [the undersecured party's] unsecured claim were lower and the
trade debt were higher, or if there were other impaired cases that favored the
plan, a cramdown plan would be more realistic. That Greystone's cramdown
plan may not succeed on the facts before us does not disprove the utility of
the cramdown provision. The state law distinction between Code-created
unsecured deficiency claims and other unsecured claims does not alone
warrant separate classification.
Id.
There is much wrong with this passage. First, the § 1111(b) election is precisely
what the undersecured party did not make, hence entitling it to an award of recourse
against the debtor. Second, Judge Clark's opinion did not eliminate the purpose of
recourse under § I 111 l(b)(1)(A). In fact, Clark painstakingly defined the purpose of §
1111 (b)(1)(A) as giving the undersecured creditor an advantage in cram down, not an
advantage under § 1 129(a)(10). From that perspective, Clark's opinion does not eliminate
the utility of § 1111(b)(1)(A) for undersecured parties, though, admittedly, one might
think that § 1111 (b)(1)(A) also has the purpose of giving undersecured creditors a veto
over plan confirmation via § 1129(a)(10). In any case, all of Clark's comments on the
purpose of § 1111(b)(1)(A) related to the jurisprudential exercise undertaken before he
decided that some reason other than gerrymandering had to be found to justify the
separate classification of trade creditors. This latter view was precisely the view that
Judge Jones adopted in her own opinion. Hence, the entire passage quoted above does
not address the actual reasons Clark presented for upholding the separate classification
of trade debt.
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impractical) requirements of Section 1129(a)(10)"58 was not a reason for
approving the separate classification of trade debt. Rather, it was part of
Clark's jurisprudential frolic-and-detour that preceded the presentment of the
reasons.
The third reason that Judge Jones discussed finally had some bite. Judge
Clark found that the need to keep the trade creditors happy justified their
separate classification, but Judge Jones spotted a non sequitur in these
reasons. The plan itself had no relation to the happiness of the trade
creditors. In fact, the plan treated the trade claims and the deficit claim of
the undersecured creditors precisely alike; each class received 3.42 cents on
the dollar.'59 If trade creditors received better treatment, it was by virtue of
the liabilities the general partners had to the trade creditors outside the
plan."6 Furthermore, no evidence existed on the record to support the view
that trade creditors would punish the debtor unless they were separately
classified under the plan so that the plan could be confirmed. 161
Perhaps Judge Clark was guilty of confounding two different issues.
One issue is whether different classes of the same rank may be accorded
different treatment in spite of section 1129(b)(1)'s equal protection rule.
Preferential treatment may be justified by the need to keep certain key trade
creditors happy. This issue is different from whether creditor democracy is
served, or disserved, by different voting classifications. Keeping the trade
creditors happy might justify a better dividend, but it is hard to see how the
same dividend would make the trade creditors happier.
But even if this conflation of two different issues is conceded, still
Judge Jones ignored other compelling reasons for separate classifications of
trade debt. First and foremost, trade claims have a different priority than an
artificial recourse claim stemming from section 111 l(b)(1)(A).6 2
Second, aside from this priority consideration, the trade creditors still
faced a different economic situation. They could collect from the general
partners, while the mortgagee could not. 6 If the trade creditors had been
158. Greystone, 102 B.R. at 566.
159. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1280-81.
160. Cf. In re Kliegl Bros. Univ. Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. .306 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Holland, J.) (plan preferred and separately classified union in order to
keep them cooperative).
161. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1281. For a case following Judge Jones in all respects,
see In re Cantonwood Assocs., 138 B.R. 648, 655 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Goodman,
J.).
162. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
163. Recourse against sureties was found capable of justifying separate classification
in In re Creekside Landing Ltd., 140 B.R. 713,715 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992) (Lundin,
J.); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (Lundin, J.)
(disapproving plan on other grounds). It was found incapable of justifying separate
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placed in the same class as the unsecured deficit claim of the mortgagee,
their interests would have been swamped by the inconsistent interests of the
mortgagee.'6 Surely the trade creditors' opinion is worth something, even
though their claims are modest compared to that of the dominant secured
creditor. Indeed, under the view that minor creditors don't count but
dominant secured creditors do, one should remember that a secured creditor
whose deficit claim is only thirty-four percent of the total secured claims can
still veto a chapter 11 plan. Therefore, by asserting that the unsecured
deficit must be classified with all other general creditor claims, Judge Jones
is not simply ignoring a few minor trade creditors, but is potentially
ignoring a large majority of unsecured creditors. 65
B. Other Practical Differences
One aspect of the Greystone opinion that has already seriously
undermined Judge Jones'sjihad against gerrymandering is her remark that,
in Greystone, the separate classification was a gerrymander "[b]ecause there
is no separate treatment of the trade creditors in this case."' 66 If Judge
Jones meant that separate classification of the unsecured deficit is permissi-
ble because the plan itself creates a discrimination, then Greystone is useless
in preventing gerrymandering. This point was driven home by Judge Frank
Monroe in In re Schoeneberg.67 Emphasizing that the plan in Greystone
treated the unsecured deficit claim and the trade claims identically, 16 Judge
Monroe concluded that "the Fifth Circuit left open the door for separate
classification of unsecured debt so long as it is treated separately and there
exists good business reasons for the separate classification and treat-
ment. "1
69
The reason offered by the debtor in Schoeneberg for separate classifica-
classes in Piedmont Assocs. v. Cigna Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 132 B.R. 75,
78 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Forrester, J.).
164. In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)
(Queenan, J.).
165. For example, in In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993) (Brozman, J.), the dominant undersecured creditor exercising the veto had an
unsecured deficit claim of $103 million, while an even more junior secured party (whose
claim was completely under water) had a $61 million claim. Judge Tina Brozman ruled
against separate classification in order to uphold the veto of the dominant creditor.
However, here one can see that the "minor" creditor who was denied a voice was no
minor creditor at all.
166. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1281.
167. 156 B.R. 963 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
168. Id. at 967-68.
169. Id. at 968.
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tion was that the secured party, who claimed cattle as collateral, had been
harmed by a recent precipitous fall in market prices. It was therefore
"important to give [the secured party] replacement collateral and not the
other unsecured creditors."17 That is, the plan treated the unsecured
deficit claim better than the other creditors, which seemed to be enough to
justify separate classification. Indeed, given the better treatment, Judge
Monroe went so far as to question the honesty of the secured creditor's
motives for seeking a classification veto."'
Can different treatment in the plan justify separate classification?1" If
170. Id.
171. According to Judge Monroe:
So, the crux of the different classification and better treatment is that the
[unsecured deficit] is being treated better than the other unsecured creditors;
and it is complaining. Not only does a question of standing to complain arise,
but a question with regard to the motivation to the objecting party arises.
Clearly [the secured party] has told its lawyers to do whatever is necessary
to make sure that the Debtor's plan is not confirmed regardless of what it
provides and to push its own liquidation plan instead. The purpose is to try
to force full payment of all its claims in cash as soon as possible regardless
of the effect on the Debtor's business and the Debtor's ability to earn a living
for himself as a rancher in the future.
Id. at 968-69.
172. For a case answering no, see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Roswell-
Hannover Joint Venture (In re Roswell-Hannover Joint Venture), 149 B.R. 1014 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992). In Roswell-Hannover, the debtor had proposed to discriminate between
the trade creditors and the unsecured deficit. The trade creditors were to get only 25 %,
while unsecured deficit was to be allocated 40 cents on the dollar. The debtor then went
on to argue that, given the different treatment in the plan, separate classification for
voting purposes was mandated.
Judge Bihary rejected the classification for voting purposes on the ground that the
"better" treatment of the unsecured deficit (40%) was not really better than the treatment
of the trade claims (25%) because the trade claims would be paid in cash and the
unsecured deficit would be paid over time. However, because the valuation of the deficit
claim is supposed to be based on genuine present value, Judge Bihary was in the position
of implying that the valuation of the 40% was defective-that the 40% was really only
25%.
Nevertheless, Roswell-Hannover was wrongly decided for precisely the same reason
that Greystone was wrongly decided. The lender in Roswell-Hannover was a nonrecourse
secured creditor. The unsecured deficit claim in chapter 11 was artificial recourse.
Therefore, the claim was junior to any claim that had recourse in a hypothetical chapter
7 proceeding. Because of this priority difference, artificial recourse was not only
permissible, but was compulsory.
Judge Bihary's opinion in Roswell-Hannover may be compared to its mirror
opposite in In re Pattne Holdings, 151 B.R. 628 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992). In Pattne
Judge Homer Drake thought that the mere origin of the claim justifies separate classifi-
cation. He concluded that an unsecured franchisor was simply inherently different from
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so, Greystone is a paper tiger, and the classification veto is dead. Of course,
in Greystone, everyone overlooked the fact that trade claims have a higher
priority than does the unsecured deficit claim of the dominant secured
creditor. Therefore, the classification veto ought to be dead. But in a case
where the unsecured deficit is not an artificial recourse claim, different
treatment in the plan should not justify separate classification.'73 The plan
itself is capable of treating very similar creditors differently, thereby
allowing absolutely free gerrymandering. Rather, voting should be
conducted on the basis of preconfirnation factors. If voting is designed to
provide for creditor expression of just treatment, only preconfirmation
differences can make manifest these expressions of creditor opinion.
Other practical differences have been considered as well. A point that
has often been overlooked in this controversy is that the unsecured deficit
claim is being used strategically to bolster the position of the separate
secured claim. In Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,74 the Supreme
Court approved the mortgagee's voting its unsecured deficit in aid of the
secured claim. According to Justice Byron White:
Respondents contend that the nature of bankruptcy proceedings-
namely, their status as proceedings in "equity"-prevents petitioners
from inequitably voting in'the class of unsecured creditors, and requires
that a "fair and equitable" reorganization plan in the best interests of all
creditors and debtors be confirmed. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
found it significant that-in its view-respondents' wholly unsecured
creditors (as opposed to petitioners, who have partially secured claims)
would fare better under the proposed reorganization plan than if the
farm was liquidated.
The short answer to these arguments is that whatever equitable
powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code. The Code provides that
undersecured creditors can vote in the class of unsecured creditors, the
Code provides that a "fair and equitable" reorganization plan is one
trade creditors and, thus, could be classified separately. Furthermore, he determined that
a 33% dividend to the large franchise creditor (due over time with no interim interest
payments) was not discriminatory compared to the 25 % cash payment the creditors would
receive. Rarely have judges from the same judicial district reached such disparate results!
173. According to § 1123(a)(4), creditors treated differently under the plan cannot be
put in the same class, "unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less
favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest." 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988).
Because the trade creditors in Schoeneberg had voted yes on the plan, they arguably had
agreed to a lesser treatment within the meaning of § 1123(a)(4). Therefore, they could
be put in the same class as the better treated deficit claim, which gave the dominant
undersecured creditor an effective veto over the plan.
174. 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (White, J.).
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which complies with the absolute priority rule, and the Code provides
that it is up to the creditors-and not the courts-to accept or reject a
reorganization plan which fails to provide them adequate protection or
fails to honor the absolute priority rule.175
Does not this right to vote the unsecured deficit claim in aid of the separate
secured claim give the mortgagee economic interests that are different from
those of the trade creditors?
176
This argument received a mystifying dismissal from Judge Samuel Alito
in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Route 37 Business Park
Associates. 7' As Judge Alito noted, "The distinction between those who
do and do not 'truly act[] in their interests as unsecured creditors' finds no
support in the Code." 17' He further stated:
Absent bad faith or illegality, the Code is not concerned with a claim
holder's reason for voting one way or the other, and undoubtedly most
claim holders vote in accordance with their overall economic interests
as they see them. Moreover, even if the concept of an unsecured
creditor that truly acts in its interest as an unsecured creditor were
meaningful, it is not apparent that trade creditors.., would fall within
this concept any more than holders of unsecured deficiency claims.
Trade creditors are often thought to vote their unsecured claims in order
to further their interests as potential future suppliers of goods and
services to the debtor. Thus, they could be said to be voting to further
their interests as future contractors with the debtor rather than their
interests as unsecured creditors.
179
In other words, Judge Alito seems to have interpreted the debtor's argument
in a curious way: those who vote according to the abstract concerns of a
175. Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted).
176. See In re SM 104 Ltd., No. 92-22698-BKC-AJC, 1993 WL 366619, at *13-17
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 1993) (Ginsburg, J.) ("quite persuasive"); In re Marin Town
Ctr., 142 B.R. 374, 379 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Patel, J.); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134
B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.) ("In light of the heavy linkage
in law and fact between the FDIC's secured and unsecured claims, its unsecured claim
is that in name only."); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989)
(Lundin, J.) ("every incentive to vote its large deficiency claim to affect the treatment
of its secured claim"). But cf. In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1019-20
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Brozman, J.) (acknowledging the bias of the undersecured
creditor in voting the unsecured claim but nevertheless refusing to justify a separate
classification on this ground).
177. 987 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993).
178. Id. at 161.
179. Id. at 161-62
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general creditor ought to vote separately from those who vote in a self-
interested manner. As all creditors vote according to self-interest, Judge
Alito thought the classification to be based on phony distinctions.
This interpretation badly misunderstands the claim the debtor was, or
should have been, making. The claim is that practical differences in the self-
interest of creditors justify separate classification. The claim that trade
creditors vote according to some Kantian noumenal essence of general
credit, while the unsecured deficit creditor does not, is a foolish claim, but
presumably not the one debtor's counsel was making.
As to the point that the Bankruptcy Code does not concern itself with
why creditors vote the way they do, nothing could be further from the truth.
Quite the opposite is true. Greystone"8' itself holds that classification rests
on practical differences between creditors. According to this view, classifi-
cation should be molded to give every group a voice depending on their
particular circumstances, and the Bankruptcy Code is vitally concerned with
the reasons creditors have for voting.' 8'
V. UNNECESSARY IMPAIRMENT
As an adjunct to anti-gerrymandering agitation, some dominant
creditors have started to argue that impairment of minor trade creditors and
the like is unnecessary and in bad faith."s If this argument prevails, a
court might nullify the vote of an artificially impaired class of creditors,
18 3
thereby assuring that the debtor-in-possession will run aground upon the
shoals of section 1129(a)(10).
Of course, impairment can mean just about anything that changes the
state-law rights of creditors. According to section 1124, "[A] class of claims
or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or
interest of such class, the plan- (1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable,
180. An opinion cited by Judge Alito with admiration, by the way. Route 37, 987 F.2d
at 159.
181. For another exercise in pragmatic differentiation, see FHG Realty Credit Corp.
v. Newark Airport/Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 155 B.R. 93, 98-99 (D.N.J. 1993) (Bassler,
J.) (holding that union claims from rejected executory contract could be separately
classified because the union cared about future jobs).
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (plan can be confirmed only if the plan "has been
proposed in good faith").
183. According to Bankruptcy Code § 1126(e): "On request of a party in interest, and
after notice and a hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or
rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good
faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e). One might
argue that unnecessary impairment constitutes the bad-faith "procuring" of the class's
acceptance.
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and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of
such claim.' Thus, one commentator remarks: "Impairment is an easily
met standard. Virtually any alteration of a creditor's rights-no matter how
minor-will suffice. Even enhancement of a claim constitutes impair-
ment." 185
At least one court has rejected the idea that impairment can be a sham.
In In re Sun Country Development, Inc.,6 a secured creditor argued that
impairment was unnecessary and therefore the entire plan was in bad faith.
Judge Thomas Reavley disagreed: "Congress made the cram down available
to debtors; use of it to carry out a reorganization cannot be bad faith."" s
Judge Glen Ayers has managed to disable Sun Country by pointing to
a phrase in Judge Reavley's opinion indicating that impairment was
necessary after all."'8 Since the Sun Country court did not need to rule on
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
185. Meltzer, supra note 114, at 310-11 (footnotes omitted). For cases holding that
enhancement of creditor rights is impairment, see L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki
Leasing Int'l, Inc., 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain, J.) (debtor-in-possession
argues enhanced creditor was unimpaired, so that creditor's plan could not be confirmed
because no impaired class of creditors voted yes on the plan); In re Temple Zion, 125
B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.); cf. In re Barrington Oaks Gen.
Partnership, 15 B.R. 952, 962 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey, J.) (emphasizing that
valuation should not play a role in determining whether impairment exists).
One court has held that increasing the rights of a creditor is not impairment:
In a flawed syllogistic attempt, the Debtor argues that because a class
may be impaired even where the value of a claim is enhanced, the class is
impaired. Yet this conclusion is neither supported by law nor logic... . "[I]f
the [D]ebtor were correct,. . . any time a plan proponent needed an impaired
class for a favorable vote, the debtor would simply add $1.00 to such class
members' claims-a transparent and unacceptable stratagem."
Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership), 154
B.R. 617, 623 (D. Conn. 1993) (Nevas, J.) (alterations in original). Actually, the broad
definition of impairment is supported by both law and logic. If any change is impairment,
then a change for the better is no different. Judge Alan Nevas goes on to note that the
debtor argued only that the creditors' rights were enhanced, not altered. For this
unhappy choice of words, the debtor lost a chance to cram down its plan. Id.
186. 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985).
187. Id. at 408; see also In re Landing Assocs., 157 B.R. 791, 812-15 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1993) (Clark, J.) (rejecting claim of unnecessary impairment); Greystone I Joint
Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 570-71 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (Clark, J.) (same), aft'd, 127
B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 72 (1992).
188. In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers,
C.J.) (citing Sun Country, 764 F.2d at 408 ("[E]ven if [the creditor's] argument went to
the issue of good faith, the district court, after a hearing, found that the status of the
unsecured creditors was changed because Sun Country's cash flow was insufficient to pay
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the permissibility of sham impairment, Judge Ayers felt free to knock out
a chapter 11 on this ground. In contrast, Judge Leif Clark insisted that the
meaning of Sun Country was that the debtor was completely free to impair
a class as it saw fit, without a showing that impairment was "neces-
sary."189 But just in case Ayers was right, Clark also located a slight
convenience for the debtor in impairing the trade creditors, thereby proving
impairment was "necessary" after all. "9
In contrast, other courts have struck down plans on grounds of bad-faith
artificial impairment.' This may have occurred in In re 266 Washington
Associates."9 In this case, Judge Jerome Feller would not permit separate
classification of trade debt. One of his many reasons was that the debtor had
not paid interest to the undersecured party since the beginning of the
bankruptcy proceeding. 93 Feller therefore deduced that the debtor was
awash in unencumbered cash that could have been used to pay the trade
creditors. Accordingly, if the trade creditors were impaired, it was an
illegitimate tactical impairment that could not be condoned.'
94
It is not clear how this suspicion of artificial impairment squared with
the assignment of rents the undersecured creditor claimed in the Washington
Associates case. Unless this lien on rents was somehow void in bankruptcy,
all the rents belonged to the secured party. These rents were cash collateral,
which could not be used without adequately protecting the undersecured
party in some way. 95 As the debtor had no other income except rent, the
off the debts [to the unsecured creditors] at the initiation of the plan.")).
189. In re Landing Assocs., 157 B.R. 791, 813-14 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
190. Id. at 814-15.
191. E.g., Windsor on the River Assocs. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re
Windsor on the River Assocs.), No. 92-3712, 1993 WL 394319 (8th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993)
(Arnold, J.); Sandy Ridge Dev. Co. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev.
Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1353 (5th Cir. 1989) (Garwood, J.); Willows Convalescent Ctrs.
Ltd. Partnership v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. (In re Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd.
Partnership), 151 B.R. 220, 223 (D. Minn. 1991) (Alsop, J.); In re Lettick Typographic,
Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38-39 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (Shiff, J.) ("In a transparent attempt
to stage compliance with (a)(10), the debtor created an artificially impaired class by
amending its Second Plan so that [an otherwise unimpaired creditor] is to be paid two
weeks after the effective date of the Plan."); In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421, 427
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers, C.J.); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 319-29 (artificial
impairment should not be allowed because otherwise the veto of 1129(a)(10) is trivial).
192. 141 B.R. 275 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nora. 266 Washington Assocs. v.
Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington Assocs.), 147 B.R. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
193. Undersecured creditors are not entitled to postpetition interest under the holding
of United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)
(Scalia, J.).
194. Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287.
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
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debtor may have had no unencumbered dollars with which to pay the trade
creditors. If so, then Judge Feller's claim of sham impairment does not hold
up.
When a debtor-in-possession is solvent, it is possible to write a plan in
which no class of general creditors is impaired. 96 But when the debtor-in-
possession is insolvent, impairment of some creditor class is inevitable."9
Now a dominant undersecured creditor claiming that the yes vote of
trade creditors ought not to be honored is in the delicate position of
demanding that discrimination occur, so that extra resources are used to pay
off the trade creditors. Furthermore, as Judge Leif Clark has empha-
sized,' 98 the dominant undersecured creditor is complaining of the impair-
ment of creditors who actually saw fit to vote "yes" on the plan. If the
impaired creditor is happy, why should some other creditor be allowed to
complain of impairment?
196. Thus, in Windsor on the River Assocs. v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In
re Windsor on the River Assocs.), No. 92-3712, 1993 WL 394319 (8th Cir. Oct. 8,
1993), Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold ruled that an apparently solvent debtor could not
impair the small trade creditors to win a yes vote from their class.
197. One dominant secured creditor recently claimed that, because the chapter 11 plan
contemplated a new value contribution by the old equity holders, the postconfirmation
estate would have the wherewithal to pay the trade creditors. Accordingly, impairment
was unnecessary and a sham, on this argument. Judge Gregory Kishel rejected this
argument, but only because the debtor did not have the opportunity to develop the record
on whether impairment was necessary. In re Kellogg Square Partnership, No. 3-92-5211,
1993 WL 434051 (Bankr. D. Minn. Oct. 22, 1993). This argument is quite ominous, in
that all single-asset cases entail new value as a subterfuge of the absolute priority rule.
See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
The argument, however, should be rejected on the following grounds: a new value
contribution can occur only after the bankrupt estate has been valued for purposes of
cram down. Through this valuation, the entitlements of the trade creditors are set. Only
after the entitlements are calculated does the new value flow in. Accordingly, the trade
creditors have no right to receive the new value; their right is only to the preconfirmation
value of the firm. Therefore, the availability of new value should never constitute
grounds to find that impairment is unnecessary.
If the rule were otherwise, and assuming that a bankruptcy court's valuation of the
firm is correct, then no investor would ever buy newly issued equity shares in a chapter
11 firm, for the same reason that investors would never buy shares in an insolvent
company. Such investments assign all or part of the investment to the creditors-a sort
of gift from equity to debt. Only if equity believes the valuations are wrong would such
an investment make sense. See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers,
87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 1011-91 (1989) (criticizing the new value exception on the
assumption that creditors are entitled to all new value contributed).
For this reason, the possibility of a new value exception should not be used to prove
that impairment is a sham and that § 1129(a)(10) cannot be met.
198. In re Landing Assocs., 157 B.R. 791, 814 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
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Yet a point made earlier has some force in favor of sham impairment,
at least in some cases. As was stated earlier, trade claims have a higher
priority in chapter 11 than do artificial recourse claims-by virtue of
Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a)(7), which ties chapter 11 entitlements to
chapter 7 entitlements. 199 Therefore, at least in a case where the general
partner is solvent, the trade creditors should always get 100 cents on the
dollar in chapter 11. Accordingly, impairment is always less than necessary
in such cases.
But this does not prove that a debtor-in-possession has a duty to render
a creditor unimpaired. No such duty is set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.
The rules pertaining to impairment do establish certain consequences
pertaining to voting; but nowhere is it written that a debtor-in-possession has
a duty to maximize the opportunity for one single creditor to veto the
proceedings. If debtors have a duty to minimize the chances of confirming
a chapter 11 plan by strategically disimpairing all creditors in favor of the
plan, chapter 11 jurisprudence would be substantially different from what
it is.
VI. BUYOUTS OF THE TRADE CREDITORS
The Washington Associates court ruled that the impairment of the trade
creditors was unnecessary and that these trade creditors should therefore be
treated as an unimpaired class, with no standing to propel the debtor past the
stumbling block of section 1129(a)(10). In addition to the above accusation
of sham impairment, the undersecured party in Washington Associates
apparently stood ready to pay the trade creditors itself just to get rid of
them. °" Judge Feller appeared impressed with this offer in the course of
proclaiming the impairment to be a sham.2"' Therefore, it is possible that
the mere offer of the dominant secured party to buy out the trade creditors
will prevent their impairment (though, it is hoped, the undersecured party
should, in fairness, be forced to go through with its offer once the automatic
stay has been lifted because no reorganization plan can be confirmed).
Assuming the trade claims are actually purchased, the dominant secured
creditor is in a position to deny the debtor a yes-voting class. Should this
defensive use of trading claims in bankruptcy be permitted?
There is substantial authority for the proposition that claims bought for
the purpose of blocking confirmation of a plan should not be allowed to
vote.2" According to section 1126(e), "On request of a party in interest,
199. See supra text accompanying notes 74-92.
200. Washington Assocs., 141 B.R. at 287.
201. Id. at 287 n.20.
202. For a recent case, see Wiston XXIV Ltd. Partnership, 153 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D.
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and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate any entity whose
acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not
solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of
this title."203 The legislative history also hints that a purchase of unsecured
claims by a secured creditor might be in bad faith:
Subsection (e) permits the court to designate for any class of claims or
interests any person that has, with respect to that class, a conflict of
interest that is of such nature as would justify exclusion of that person's
claim or interest from the amounts and number specified in subsection
(c) or (d). A person might have such a conflict, for example, where he
held a claim or interest in more than one class. Exclusion from one class
for voting purposes would not require his exclusion from the other class
as well.204
One case the legislative history specifically condemns 5 is Aladdin Hotel
Co. v. Bloom,2"5 a case where shareholders who bought debentures used
their blocking position to enhance the plan's treatment of the equity
shareholders. Similarly, the votes of trade claims purchased by the dominant
secured creditor in order to achieve a veto of the plan might be struck down
as votes cast in bad faith in violation of section 1126(e).
This leaves the difficult question of what a court might do when the
dominant creditor has purchased all the trade claims. If all these votes are
disqualified, it is still true that no class of creditors will have voted in favor
of the plan, as section 1129(a)(10) requires. In such a situation, a court may
have to rule, after taking evidence, that the trade claims would have voted
for the plan. This hypothetical vote would then have to suffice to meet the
requirements of section 1129(a)(10). Otherwise, bad faith will be seen to
prevail so long as it is thoroughgoing.
Kan. 1993) (Puasteri, J.).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1988).
204. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 41, at 411, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6367. Section 1126(e) has its origin in the case of Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco
Development Co., 87 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937). In
this case, a disgruntled lessee, who was made to forfeit hotel improvements under the
lease, bought enough unsecured claims to block the plan. The Fifth Circuit saw nothing
wrong with this maneuver. To reverse this case, Congress enacted § 203 of the
Bankruptcy Act, requiring that votes be cast in good faith. See Young v. Higbee Co.,
324 U.S. 204, 211 n.10 (1945). Therefore, § 1126(c) stems from a distaste for the
practice of buying up claims just to interfere with confirmation of the plan. See Fortgang
& Mayer, supra note 25, at 91-99.
205. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 41, at 411, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6367.
206. 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953).
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One should also remember that, even if a dominant creditor has bought
all or substantially all of the impaired claims, a blocking strategy could have
been accomplished by merely purchasing thirty-four percent of the impaired
claims.' 7 In other words, a secured party could discriminate among
general creditors, paying a premium only to the point necessary to establish
its veto; the rest of the general creditors could be ignored. Any court
approving the purchase of claims to block confirmation should be aware that
a broad holding to this effect is potentially anti-majoritarian, discriminatory,
and undemocratic. 8
VII. CONCLUSION: SHOULD SEPARATE CLASSIFICATION BE ALLOWED?
In this Article, I have taken the position that, in cases involving a
dominant secured creditor, separate classification should be allowed. The
dominant secured creditor should not have an absolute veto over the plan
when differently situated creditors are in favor of it. The following reasons
can be asserted in favor of liberal classification and against the veto.
To start with, the two prevailing interpretations of section 1122 both
sustain separate classification. According to one of these interpretations, any
practical difference between unsecured creditors can justify separate
classification. On this view, it must be said that the practical concerns of the
dominant secured creditor and the trade creditors (or other comparatively
minor unsecured creditors) diverge radically. This is especially so because
the Supreme Court in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers ° hinted that
the dominant secured creditor can vote the unsecured claim in aid of the
secured claim. If this conflict of interest is allowed, it must be conceded that
the interests of the dominant creditor in its unsecured phase and the other
general creditors can be highly diverse.
Under the competing interpretation of section 1122, separate classifica-
tions can be justified only if an unsecured creditor has a different legal
priority than the other general creditors. Even under this more rigorous rule,
separate classification can be justified because the dominant secured
creditor's unsecured claim is subject to unique rights. First, when the
undersecured creditor relies on artificial recourse under section
111 1(b)(1)(A), the trade creditors have a higher priority by virtue of section
207. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
208. One further limitation recently imposed is that any buyout of happy trade
creditors must occur before the trade creditors have actually voted. In In re Kellogg
Square Partnership, No. 3-92-5211, 1993 WL 434051 (Bankr. D. Minn. Oct. 22, 1993),
Judge Gregory Kishel ruled that a dominant undersecured creditors buying trade claims
could not change the vote from yes to no once the vote had been cast.
209. 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (White, J.).
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1129(a)(7). Second, as Judge Queenan emphasized in In re Bjolmes Realty
Trust,2 ° the unsecured claim can make the section 1111(b)(2) election.
Third, the unsecured claim is entitled to (and routinely gets) postpetition
proceeds as collateral and any other appreciation value that might accrue.
In other words, especially in a real estate case, the unsecured deficit claim
is always potentially a secured claim, whenever appreciation value is
conceivable.
Therefore, under either interpretation of section 1122, separate
classification can be strongly justified.2"1
Meanwhile, the case against separate classification, asserted by Judge
Jones and quite dutifully repeated by a legion of courts since then, is that
separate classification of the unsecured deficit claim is "gerrymandering."
But this is mere name calling. Gerrymandering is simply a classification
where no significant difference exists between the classes-where the debtor-
in-possession wants only to subvert the harsh rule of section 1129(a)(10).
Yet, as has just been argued, practical and legal differences usually exist
between the unsecured deficit claim of the dominant creditor and the
unsecured claims of ordinary creditors. When these differences exist-and
when one class of impaired creditors votes yes on the plan-then it is fair
to say that the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) have been met.212
The assertion that the dominant secured creditor deserves a veto appears
to be unpersuasive, as a policy matter. The dominant creditor would like to
use a veto through its unsecured deficit claim, thereby overriding the will
of lesser creditors, but unsecured creditors are supposed to be equal in
bankruptcy. Granting a veto to the unsecured creditor makes the dominant
creditor better than equal, contrary to the esprit of the Bankruptcy Code.
The issue of the veto raises, of course, the purpose of bankruptcy.
There is substantial opinion that the bankruptcy courts should not traffic in
single-asset cases. But the following point can be made about these single-
210. 134 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.).
211. Peter Meltzer, who prefers a dominant creditor veto, disfavors the "flexible"
view and favors the view that only difference in legal priority justifies separate classifica-
tion: "There are simply too many instances where a creditor's vote on a gi,en plan may
be affected by a whole range of considerations which are completely unrelated to that
creditor's proposed treatment as the member of a given class." Meltzer, supra note 114,
at 300. This view overlooks the point that, even under a more stringent "priority" view,
the unsecured claim is inherently different from other unsecured claims, because of the
higher priority for trade creditors implied by § 723, the § 1111 (b)(2) election, and the
prospect of accumulating cash collateral as time passes.
212. Linda J. Rusch, Gerrymandering the Classification Issue in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 163, 200-01 ("In fact, giving the dissident
creditor the classification club would work against two primary Code purposes-debtor
relief and a preference for feasible reorganizations .... ").
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asset cases featuring one dominant creditor: dominant isn't the same as uni-
tary. Other creditors do exist, even if their claims are minor compared to
that of the dominant creditor. Furthermore, even if these claims do not
exist, they could easily exist if an insolvent debtor treated all creditor claims
as equal. In such a case, creditor equality will mean that every creditor
suffers a shortfall. If only the dominant secured creditor remains unpaid, it
is because the debtor has preferentially diverted assets to pay the minor
creditors." 3 In other words, every "single-creditor" case is implicitly a
multiple-creditor case. The idea of single-creditor cases is therefore mislead-
ing.
Even if courts strike down separate classification of trade creditors, a
debtor willing to engage in advanced bankruptcy planning can easily evade
the rule of section 1129(a)(10). For example, if the debtor buys some
equipment on a purchase-money security interest, the newly created secured
party is clearly entitled to separate classification. If such a creditor is
cooperative, the debtor will have produced a yes-voting one-member
class.214 The same might be true of some local taxing authority with a
property tax lien, where the local authority is anxious to keep the firm
going. There are literally infinite possibilities for evading section
1 129(a)(10), if a debtor can plan for chapter 11 in advance. 5
213. See Robert K. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lenders' Remedies Need an
Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1988 (1976).
214. Rusch, supra note 212, at 203. Of course, a judge may strike down such a set-up
as an abuse of process. See Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd. Partnership v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. (In re Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd. Partnership), 151 B.R. 220, 223 (D.
Minn. 1991) (Alsop, J.) (yes vote of small secured creditor class struck down as sham
impairment). But this possibility should not render the Bankruptcy Code immune from
criticism. Indeed, if we can always rely on the intuition of judges to correct all faults,
there would be no need for the Bankruptcy Code in the first place.
215. One idea that will not work is to impair an administrative creditor or postpetition
lender. According to § 1126(a), only creditors with claims under § 502 can vote. Since
administrative creditors and postpetition lenders do not have claims under § 502-their
claims are allowed under § 503(b) or § 364-they are disenfranchised. In re Kliegl Bros.
Univ. Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). But see In re
Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 114 B.R. 1003 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990)
(McGarrity, J.). In Century Investment, the debtor presented a plan in which one of the
classes consisted of postpetition lenders who proposed to advance funds if the plan were
confirmed. The court hinted that such a classification was legitimate and that, if the class
voted yes, § 1129(a)(10) would be met. Yet, § 1129(a)(10) requires that an impaired
class of creditors vote yes on the plan. How could an entity that had not yet even
advanced funds be viewed as "impaired" by the plan? Impairment presupposes some pre-
existing loan agreement, and the plan cuts back on these contractual rights. In addition,
§ 1126(a) implies that only claims allowed under § 502 can vote; yet postpetition lending
claims are allowed under § 503. Cf. In re Atlanta W. VI, 91 B.R. 620 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1988) (Cotton, J.) (postpetition lender already had a prepetition unsecured impaired
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Yet it must be admitted that the argument to the contrary is not without
force. Traditionally, the purposes of bankruptcy are (1) to give debtors a
fresh start, and (2) to maximize collections from the debtor's estate. In
single-asset real estate cases, the argument for the fresh start of the debtor
is somewhat weakened. If bankruptcy refuses to intervene in these cases,
state-law foreclosure is readily capable of at least saving the jobs of the
custodian and the rental agent. Any buyer of the property is likely to retain
the old personnel if they have been doing a good job. The general partners
are usually cold-hearted, sophisticated investors who knowingly took risks
they are well able to bear. The limited partners are usually dentists on the
lookout for tax shelters. These dubious characters are not compelling
candidates for bankruptcy's fresh start.
Nevertheless, the premise of chapter 11 is that all creditors are at least
as well off in chapter 11 as in chapter 7. If one has confidence in the ability
of a court to do valuations, then this "best interest of the creditors" test is
always capable of papering over objections to the use of chapter 11 in lieu
of some other mode of liquidation.2" 6 Thus, in Toibb v. Radloff,217 the
Supreme Court held that, under the literal language of the Bankruptcy Code,
a consumer could file a chapter 11 plan.218 When the objection was raised
that consumers under chapter 11 could keep their postpetition wages when
chapter 13 debtors could not, Justice Blackmun dismissed the objection by
reminding us that creditors are at least as well off in chapter 11 as in
liquidation.2"9
Similarly, we need not worry too much about using chapter 11 in
single-asset cases because the premise of chapter 11 is that the creditors
must be at least as well off there as in liquidation. For example, precisely
this observation was used to excuse the classification peculiarities in Seidel
v. Palisades-on-the-Desplaines (In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines),2 a
leading pre-Code case. Furthermore, single-asset cases are singularly hard
to cram down over the opposition of the dominant secured creditor when the
security interest encumbers the income stream of the debtor.
In valuing the asset of the debtor, the net cash flow of the asset should
just precisely equal the cram-down interest rate necessary to render any
claim).
216. In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993)
(Bohanon, J.).
217. 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991) (Blackmun, J.).
218. Id. at 2199.
219. Id. at 2201. Furthermore, if liquidation sales preserve going concern value, then
§ 1 129(a)(7) is hard to meet, and the chapter 11 proceeding therefore must collapse.
Salvatore G. Gangemi & Stephen Bordanaro, The New Value Exception: Square Peg in
a Round Hole, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. RaV. 173, 192-93 (1993).
220. 89 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1937) (Sparks, J.).
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cram-down debt instruments equal to the present value of the collateral. In
such a case, the confirmability of the chapter 11 plan must depend on
substantial new value contributions of the old equity participants, or on
irrational expectations that the real estate market will turn around in the
future."2 If a bankruptcy judge values the asset correctly, cram down will
be rare and entirely beneficial to all concerned. According to Professor
Linda Rusch, liberal classification "allows a dispassionate third party, the
bankruptcy judge, to decide whether the reorganization fulfills the Code's
requirements and purposes."' Meanwhile, "[t]he undersecured creditor
...does not need the additional protection of the classification club to
protect its legitimate interests unless one is willing to state that bankruptcy
judges are not performing their statutory duty to make the judgments
required under section 1129."'
On the other hand, this must be said against cram downs of single-asset
real estate cases: Often, a liquidation means that the partners of the debtor
must realize income on their personal taxes, whereas, if a cram down can
be achieved, this income can be deferred; 4 therefore, it appears that John
Q. Public is footing the bill through what amounts to a tax subsidy. This
seems particularly unfair, especially in light of the subsidy already paid to
savings-and-loans in the 1980s through government insurance. Thanks to
relaxed regulation coupled with deposit insurance, the taxpayers provided
cheap loans for ill-considered real estate deals. Should they pay again by
subsidizing the new value contributions of the old equity participants in a
cram down of a single-asset case?
This tax angle is a serious concern, but it must be pointed out that tax
breaks routinely fuel chapter 11 proceedings. Often loss carry forwards are
the only asset a firm has; if a merger can be arranged, the new entity can
use the loss carry forwards as deductions against income. This and many
other tax practices are apparently condoned by the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, it is hard to argue that a tax subsidy should uniquely influence
bankruptcy policy in single-asset cases.
221. These expectations are irrational because a good valuation of the asset should
already include all expectations of future upside potential. If a court confirms a plan on
the theory that the real estate market may some day turn around, the court is basically
admitting that its valuation of the asset is no good.
222. Rusch, supra note 212, at 165.
223. Id. at 199.
224. See generally Albert J. Cardinali & David C. Miller, Tax Aspects of Non-
Corporate Single Asset Bankruptcies and Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 87
(1993). I would like to thank Professor Jack Williams of the Georgia State University
School of Law for emphasizing the tax angle in single-asset cases.
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